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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j): "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over . . . cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the purported assignment by Paul 
Wrathall to Maxwell Johnson in 1946 of a one-half undivided interest in an easement 
appurtenant, without the concurrent conveyance of any interest in the dominant estate, validly 
conveyed an interest in the Easement enforceable against Defendants when they acquired the 
servient estate in 1990. (Issue preserved, R. at 190-91, 466 f 1.) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to rule that Defendants were bona fide 
purchasers not subject to the purported Wrathall-Johnson assignment, inasmuch as there 
could be no constructive notice since Plaintiffs did not file the agreement containing the 
purported assignment until five years after Defendants purchase of the property was 
recorded, and inasmuch as there could be no actual notice since there was no evidence of use 
under the easement which was obvious upon inspection. (Issue preserved, R. at 187-88,466 
t2.) 
3. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs have a prescriptive 
easement in the Blue Lakes despite the fact that 
a. the original use was permissive, and continued so until 1995 (issue 
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preserved, R. at 465-66 f 4, 488 ^ 31); 
b. Plaintiffs' use was not open, since it involved no overt action on the part 
of Plaintiffs, but simply the natural accumulation of water in the South Blue Lake 
spilling around the impounding dike, flowing into the North Blue Lake basin, then (if 
the volume were great enough) trickling out of a breach in the north dike and into the 
scar of an old ditch, and thence into a ditch owned by Plaintiffs and others, and then 
if the headgate were properly set, into a lateral ditch leading to Plaintiffs' land (issue 
preserved, id, see also 486-87 If 34, 38, & 40; 488-89 ff 26-29); and 
c. Plaintiffs' use was not continuous, inasmuch as Plaintiffs did not store 
water in the Blue Lakes at any time between a time no later than 1960 and 1986 (issue 
preserved, id, see also 486-87 fflf 40-41). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in permanently enjoining Defendants from 
interfering in any way with the Plaintiffs' free and full use of the Blue Lakes Reservoir, its 
dikes and related facilities, to the total exclusion of any use by Defendants. (Issue preserved, 
R. at 464-66 ff 1,4-9.) 
Standard of Review for Issues 1, 2, 3, & 4: "Some issues involve mixed questions 
of 'whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.' Although we 
review the underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard, we have 
recently stated that the legal effect of those facts 'is the province of the appellate courts, and 
no deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law.' Drake v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (quoting, respectively, State 
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v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) and State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 
1994)). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants' Motion to Join 
Indispensable Parties, which would have required the joinder of all persons owning either 
an interest in the Higley Well water or an interest in the Blue Lakes Reservoir easement as 
an appurtenance to the real property now owned by them, originally owned by Paul Wrathall 
at the time he was granted the water storage easement by Browns and Anderson in 1946. 
(Issue preserved, R. at 56-66.) 
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's determination properly entered under Rule 
19 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." LePet. Inc. v. Mower. 872 P.2d 470, 
473 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), aff d sub nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)). 
6. Whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the 20-inch pipeline 
crossing Plaintiffs' property is inadequate to carry the flow from the Higley Wells, and that 
Defendant Arthur Higley, who owns only one-sixth of the water rights in the Higley Wells, 
is solely liable for the flooding of Plaintiffs' property in the winter of 1996-97. (Issue 
preserved, R. at 475-78 ffll 65-66, 74.) 
Standard of Review: On appellate review, purely factual questions require reversal 
only if a finding is clearly erroneous. Drake. 939 P.2d at 181 f citing State v. Thurman. 911 
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)). 
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7. Whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Defendant Arthur 
Higley wrongfully and tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs' Easement rights and converted 
Plaintiffs' water in storage to his own use or caused the storage water to run to waste (issue 
preserved, R. at 472, 477 fflf 68, 85). 
Standard of Review: On appellate review, purely factual questions require reversal 
only if a finding is clearly erroneous. Drake. 939 P.2d at 181 (citing Thurman. 911 P.2d at 
372). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3, as to issue number 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final judgment entered January 9, 1998, in this civil action 
between neighboring property owners in Tooele County. R. at 524-37. After a five-day 
bench trial held on September 10,15-16, and 29-30, 1997, which also included an on-site but 
non-record property inspection by the trial court on September 24, 1997, the lower court 
decreed that plaintiffs Johnson held a permanent and arguably exclusive easement to use the 
land of defendants Higley to store water in the Blue Lakes Reservoir sitting mostly on land 
of Higleys. The court found that the storage easement arose originally by contract in 1946 
which was still valid but also was confirmed by so-called prescriptive subsequent use. 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 40-49, R. at 526-28. 
The trial court rejected claims of Higleys that the purported assignment to plaintiffs' 
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father Max Johnson, signed in 1946 but never recorded at the county recorder's office until 
1995, of a 50% interest in a storage easement given to Paul Wrathall, was legally invalid, that 
Johnson had abandoned that easement, that a provision of a 1950 court decree had precluded 
Johnsons from using the easement, and that the prescriptive use requirements for obtaining 
a new easement had not been met. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 6-43, 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 1-9, R. at 464-66, 485-96. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The complaint in this case was filed on January 24, 1997, in the Third District Court 
in and for Tooele County. Discovery involved a single set of interrogatories and a single 
request for production of documents from each side. Defendants filed a motion on May 21, 
1998, to compel joinder of indispensable parties or to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. This 
motion was heard on July 30, 1997, and denied the same day. The order was entered on 
September 3, 1997. On August 11, 1997, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which was heard on September 3, 1997, and denied the same day. The corresponding order 
was entered on January 8, 1998. 
Trial was held on September 10, 15-16, 29-30, 1997. Closing arguments were heard 
on October 29, 1997. The court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on January 9, 
1998. Defendants filed notice of appeal on February 5, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Johnson and their Property. Plaintiffs Russell and Peter Johnson are 
brothers who engage in cattle ranching near Grantsville, Tooele County, where Russell was 
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born in 1952 and has lived virtually his entire life. R. at 557, p. 12. They are sons of 
Maxwell Johnson, who died in about 1979 or 1980. R. at 557, p. 38. Plaintiffs inherited 
from their father the Johnson cattle ranch property north and downhill from Grantsville, 
Tooele County. Id The 1981 decree of distribution of the ranch property from the estate of 
Maxwell Johnson says nothing about any easement to store water in the Blue Lakes. Tr. Exh. 
3;R. at 558, p. 258. 
Water for the irrigated portion, consisting of 192.5 acres, of the Johnson ranch 
property historically was delivered before and after the 1950 litigation described below via 
a series of ditches in water rotation turns from the western branch or "turn" of a nearby 
spring-fed stream called Fishing Creek. Tr. Exh. 10, 1950 Findings of Fact nos. 5 & 9; Tr. 
Exh. 14 (admitted for illustrative purposes only); R. at 557, pp. 14-18. Since the conclusion 
of the 1950 litigation, the water from the west turn of Fishing Creek has run in a northerly 
direction past the east side of the Blue Lakes beyond the north end of the Blue Lakes where 
the ditch curves and runs to the northwest and then north again to the Johnson property. Id 
Johnsons obtain their Fishing Creek water from a lateral ditch off the west turn of the Fishing 
Creek ditch. R. at 558, pp. 199-200. 
The Blue Lakes. The Blue Lakes are nearly-adjoining large ponds each covering 
many dozens of acres impounding water behind artificial dikes on low-lying land located 
on the northern outskirts of Grantsville, Utah, in Tooele County. R. at 557, 558, Tr. 24-27, 
35-37, 397. Prior to and as of late 1950, the Blue Lakes consisted "of two natural ponds 
which have been enlarged and improved so that they will store water; that one of said ponds 
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is southwest from the other and both are located in section 20 [of T. 2 South, R. 5 West, S. 
L. B. & M.]. Trial Exh. 10, Finding of Fact no. 9 at p. 14 of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, dated Sept. 9, 1950 in Castagno & Maxwell Johnson et al. v. Paul Wrathall et aL 
Dist. Ct. For Tooele Co., Case No. 3559 (hereinafter the "1950 litigation"). See also Trial 
Exh. 31, a map exhibit from the 1950 litigation showing two ponds. R. at 561, p. 774. 
Newer dikes were charted in design plan drawings made in late 1946 for a new 
proposed dam signed and submitted jointly by Paul Wrathall and Max Johnson as claimed 
owners in early 1947. Tr. Exh. 18. When those dikes were finally built, apparently after the 
findings entered in the 1950 litigation but by 1952, when they appear on an aerial photo, they 
created a new third pond, dividing and taking the upper part of what became the middle 
pond. R. at 558, 561, pp. 331, 792-93. That new third pond created by the new dikes, the 
most southerly pond at the highest elevation, extended south well into section 29 and was 
designed to impound up to 227 acre feet of water covering up to 85 acres. Trial Exh. 18; R. 
at 558, pp. 197-98, 256-58. Arthur Higley testified that the new south pond presently covers 
119 acres, and the two north ponds combined cover another area the same size as the south 
pond. R. at 561, 792. This newer south pond provided the storage capacity for the 1986 
Application of plaintiff Russell Johnson to appropriate and store effluent sewer water from 
the Grantsville sewer ponds first built in the 1970's. Trial Exh's 16 & 50, and R. at 557, pp. 
35-37. 
Defendants Higley and their 1990 Purchase of Property, including Blue Lakes 
Land, Defendant Arthur Higley was born in 1941. R. at 561, pp. 747. He was raised and 
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lived in Grantsville until he was 39 years old, or until about early 1981. R. at 559, p. 497. 
After he married, he moved to Salt Lake County to live there with his wife Susan. Id Arthur 
has worked in the Grantsville area all his life, even after his marriage. R. at 561, p. 747. He 
has been in the business of raising cattle and farming all his life. R. at 559, pp. 497-98. 
Arthur has been familiar with the Blue Lakes for most of his life, and helped cleaning ditches 
in that area beginning when he was six or seven years old. R. at 561, 759. 
Arthur and Susan Higley jointly acquired the land underlying most of the Blue Lakes, 
together with other surrounding land, by purchase in March, 1990, pursuant to a contract for 
deed recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's office that month. R. at 561, p.767; Exh. 
9 (reproduced at Tab 1 of Addendum). At the time of the purchase, Susan made no 
inspection of the property, but Arthur was familiar with the ditches which would convey the 
water rights he acquired in connection with that purchase. R. at 559, pp. 486, 502. He 
visited the area several times per year, cleaning ditches and doing other work there. Id. 
Arthur also inspected the ditches in 1990, to see where he would be taking his water. R. at 
559, pp. 502-3. He did not then talk to any of the property owners of the lands crossed by 
those ditches. R. at 559, p. 504. He did no research concerning those water rights at the 
time, other than to check a green book put out by the State Engineer's office concerning 
water right determinations, which mentioned that the court decree in the 1950 litigation 
governed such rights. R. at 559, 561, pp. 509, 787. He saw no need to further research the 
water rights he acquired as his seller warranted them. R. at 561, p. 787. Arthur knew that 
the Blue Lakes and their associated dikes were there at the time of his purchase. R. at 559, 
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p. 498. 
Applications to Store Water at the Blue Lakes. On November 20, 1945, Paul 
Wrathall filed an application with the Utah State Engineer to Appropriate Water for 
Irrigation Purposes in the State of Utah (hereinafter the "Wrathall Application"). Thereby, 
Paul Wrathall sought to appropriate Fishing Creek water which would be stored on the SE 
1/4 of SW 1/4; SW 1/4 of SE 1/4 of Section 20., T.2 S., R. 5 W., SLB&M, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Wrathall Parcel 1", an area then only partly covered by the Blue Lakes, 
and on adjoining northern parts of section 29, for the benefit of parts of sections 5, 6, 7, and 
8 of T2S, R5W, SLB&M. Tr. Exh's. 18, 19, 50 & 56. 
At the time the Wrathall Application was filed, Paul Wrathall owned no real property 
in said sections 5, 7, or 8, but did own the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 and the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 
of Section 6, T2S, R5W, SLB&M, which is now owned by Rulon Higley, a brother to 
Defendant Arthur Higley, and is herein referred to as the "Wrathall Parcel 2". Tr. Exh's. 10 
(Decree^), 50 & 55. 
One day before the Wrathall Application was filed, Maxwell Johnson, Plaintiffs' 
father, also filed a similar Application with the Utah State Engineer to Appropriate Water for 
Irrigation Purposes in the State of Utah (hereinafter the "Johnson Application"). Thereby, 
Maxwell Johnson sought to appropriate Fishing Creek water and to store the same on 
Wrathall Parcel 1 and on adjoining northern parts of section 29, to benefit parts of Sections 
17, 18, 19 and 20 T2S, R5W, SLB&M. Tr. Exh's. 18, 19, 50 & 56. Both the Wrathall 
Application and the Johnson Application were approved by the Utah State Engineer. Tr. 
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Exh. 19. 
Easement Granting Wrathall the Right to Store Water on Land underlying Blue 
Lakes, Not until January 15, 1946, nearly two months after the Applications were filed, did 
J. Keith Brown and Elba H. Brown, his wife, and Penina Anderson, who then owned the 
ground in question, grant an easement in the Wrathall Parcel 1 and other real property to Paul 
Wrathall. Tr. Exh. 7 (reproduced under Tab 2 of Addendum hereto). Browns and Anderson 
are the predecessors-in-interest of Defendants Higley as the owners of the land on which the 
Blue Lakes are located. The easement provided that it "shall not exceed the natural reservoir 
basin", and that the easement is only large enough to be "sufficient to contain waters run 
thereupon the the [sic] natural course thereof; (hereinafter the "Easement"). The Easement 
was recorded with the Tooele County Recorder on March 6, 1946. Tr. Exh. 7. 
Assignment of Interest in Easement to Max Johnson. On May 14, 1946, Paul and 
Carrie Wrathall, husband and wife, signed an Agreement which purports to assign to 
Maxwell Johnson, Plaintiffs father, an undivided one-half interest in the Easement. (the 
"Agreement"). Tr. Exh. 10, which 1950 court papers contain a copy of the Agreement as 
an exhibit in that action.1 While the Easement was appurtenant to only Wrathall's land, the 
Agreement explains in its first whereas clause that its intent is to allow Maxwell Johnson to 
store at the Blue Lakes a portion of his winter water from Fishing Creek as applied for in the 
Johnson Application. Wrathall did not deed his property to the Johnsons. R. at 558, p. 332. 
1
 Another copy of that same Agreement, as recorded in 1995 in the Tooele County 
Recorder's office, was received into evidence as Trial Exhibit 11. A copy thereof is attached 
hereto under Tab 3 of the Addendum. 
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The Agreement says nothing about allowing Maxwell Johnson to use the Easement for 
storage of water from any other source beyond the natural runoff addressed in the Easement 
itself. The Agreement notes that Wrathalls had easements covering "more land than is 
covered by the present dike and reservoir and that this Assignment covers only the easement 
in the lands upon which said dike and reservoir are located,. . .." fcL, at § 6. 
The 1950 Litigation. At the time of the Easement and Agreement, it was the practice 
to flood the waters of Fishing Creek in the winter months over the upstream lands of the 
upper users, including the lands of the Browns, to get it to the lands of the lower users, 
including Johnsons. Tr. Exh. 10, 1950 Findings of Fact Nos. 5-6. The practice of flooding 
the winter water and the construction of obstructions to prevent the flow of the water from 
the lands of the upper users to those of the lower users was the subject of the 1950 litigation. 
Tr. Exh. 10. 
A careful review of the 1950 litigation pleadings contained in Trial Exhibit 10 shows 
that the plaintiffs in that earlier action, who were the lower end users of Fishing Creek water, 
were attempting to procure rights to greater quantities of Fishing Creek water from the 
defendants there, the upper end users of Fishing Creek water. Tr. Exh. 10. That complaint, 
filed in 1949, was verified by Max Johnson, father of the plaintiffs at bar. Id The answer 
and counterclaim in the 1950 litigation for most of the defendants there was verified by Paul 
Wrathall. Id. The Agreement assigning an interest in the Easement to Johnson, while 
included as an exhibit in that 1950 litigation, is not otherwise expressly mentioned in any of 
the 1950 litigation filings presented at trial here, nor does it seem to have been particularly 
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at issue in that earlier lawsuit. However, that 1950 litigation did impact and undercut that 
Assignment Agreement to a limited extent as to conveyance of Fishing Creek water by the 
former practice of flooding over the lands of upper users by (1) Finding of Fact nos. 9 and 
14 of the 1950 litigation, requiring that a new connecting ditch be dug to join the west turn 
of the Fishing Creek ditch to the outlet ditch leading from the Blue Lakes, and exclusively 
used when built, to provide a bypass alternative to the earlier route of running Fishing Creek 
water of Johnsons and others through the lower or northern Blue Lakes, and (2) the 
affirmative deletion by Judge Crockett in 1950 of proposed Conclusion of Law no. 6. See 
Tr. Exh. 10, Findings of Fact, f t 9 & 14 & Conclusions of Law, f 6, also reproduced under 
Tab 4 of. Addendum hereto. 
That proposed conclusion, before it was hand-stricken and court-initialed, read: 
The plaintiffs Worthington and Johnson should be adjudged to have the right 
to divert water through the existing west ditch to the Blue Lakes, through the 
Blue Lakes to the headgate on the northerly end thereof, through said headgate 
into the existing ditch which leads to and across the lands of the plaintiff 
Johnson; that suitable measuring devices should be installed thereon as is 
provided in the Findings of Fact, and the headgate on the Blue lakes should be 
left unlocked. 
Lapsing of Johnson and Wrathall Storage Applications. Shortly after the end of 
the 1950 litigation, Johnson's Application with the State Engineer lapsed, on October 25, 
1950, for failure to file any proof of appropriation when due. Tr. Exh. 32. Wrathall's similar 
Application also later lapsed for the same reason on September 20, 1953. Tr. Exh. 32 & 50. 
Grantsville City Sewer Treatment Ponds. At some time about 1972-3, Grantsville 
City built treatment ponds for sewer water near the Blue Lakes to receive the outflow from 
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the new city sewer system. R. at 557, pp. 22-23. While they were designed to be self-
containing for many years, they did begin to leak a little after a while. R. at 561, p. 632, 643. 
Mr. Kertamus, the public works director for Grantsville City in charge of the overseeing the 
sewer plant operations since 1990, testified the original overflow from the sewer ponds was 
on the north end of the ponds, to the west of the Blue Lakes dikes, and flowed north, not 
toward or into the Blue Lakes. R. at 561, p. 636. Rulon and Arthur Higley each testified 
similarly. R. at 561, pp. 678, 768-69. 
Russell Johnson testified that he saw sewer effluent seep out of the sewer ponds as 
early as 1973, before he left to serve a church mission that year, and flow from thence into 
the Blue Lakes. R. at 557-8, pp. 22-24, 526-30. On cross-examination, Russell admitted that 
normally, in the summer months, Grantsville City did not discharge anything into the Blue 
lakes. R. at 558, p. 241. Sherman Higley also testified that some sewer water went into the 
Blue Lakes while the sewer overflow discharge location was still at the north end of the 
sewer ponds. R. at 560, 602. On redirect, Russell Johnson further testified that there were 
two means by which sewer water effluent escaped the City's sewer ponds: the designed 
overflow outlet and seepage through sewer pond walls into an unmetered drainage ditch 
which ran into the Blue Lakes, and that both sources were discharging sewer water into the 
Blue Lakes in March of 1990, when the City's official discharge measuring device, a Parshall 
Flume, showed no effluent leaving the sewer ponds. R. at 559, pp. 469-72; Tr. Exh. 53. 
The point of discharge from the sewer ponds was changed by the mid-1980's and the 
overflow of the sewer pond effluent ran out of the east side of the Grantsville City sewer 
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ponds and directly onto land owned by Grantsville City and from there on to Defendants' 
land where it was impounded in the newer south pond of the Blue Lakes, created by the 
construction, some time after 1950, of what was labeled the West Dike and the North Dike 
on design and construction plans submitted to the office of the Utah State Engineer in 1947 
by Paul Wrathall and Maxwell Johnson. R. at 561, pp. 636, Tr. Exh. 18. 
According to Grantsville's official records, in the months of June through December, 
1989, there was no sewer effluent discharged into the South Blue Lakes Reservoir. In the 
months of January and February, 1990, there was some discharge of sewer effluent onto the 
portion of the Blue Lakes owned by Grantsville City, but it was insufficient for the City to 
determine a quantity. In the month of March 1990, when Defendants purchased the real 
property on which the Blue Lakes are located, and thereafter through December, 1991, there 
was no sewer effluent discharged into the Blue Lakes. Tr. Exh. 53. 
Use of Blue Lakes by Johnsons. Arthur Higley testified that Max Johnson, before 
his death, and others, told Arthur that early on, perhaps in the period of 1945-50, that 
Wrathall and Johnson stopped using and abandoned use of the Blue Lakes for water storage 
because water accumulating there was so salty that it killed their crops when turned onto 
their lands. R. at 559, pp. 513-14. This would explain why Max Johnson and Wrathall let 
their applications lapse in 1950 & 1953. 
Arthur Higley further testified that the dike impounding water in the north Blue Lake 
washed out sometime before 1960, and was never repaired until Russell Johnson did some 
partial repair work in the 1980's. R. at 559, pp. 515-16. This was corroborated by the 
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testimony of Howard Clegg. R. at 561, p. 714-16. 
Arthur Higley further stated that to his knowledge, the Blue Lakes were not used by 
Johnsons for flood control or other purposes, but only for duck hunting and for trapping rats. 
R. at 559, p. 516. This was substantiated by trial exhibits 23 & 51 (Reproduced in under Tab 
5 of Addendum hereto). Exhibit 23 is a letter from the State Engineer's office to Russell 
Johnson dated June 2, 1986, sent to summarize discussions held with him at an inspection 
of the new dikes of the Blue Lakes about two weeks before. It contained the statement that 
"Mr. Johnson stated that the reservoir had not actively been used for many years and that to 
his knowledge there was no valid water right for the water in the reservoir." Id ; R. at 557, 
pp. 32-34; Exh. 23. 
When Russell's counsel asked him what he meant by that statement, Mr. Johnson 
explained he had been referring to the fact that a headgate and pipes which previously in 
Wrathall's day allowed water to flow in a controlled fashion from the south pond to the north 
pond had been inoperable for an unknown but lengthy time, but that those failures of long 
before did not prevent the south pond from containing water which ran into it, which when 
full enough, spilled water to the east around a dike to and through the north lakes basin from 
whence it flowed to Johnson's land when headgates located further downstream in the 
Fishing Creek ditch were set properly. R. at 557, 558, pp. 34-35, 199-200. 
The following testimony on direct examination was there given by Russell Johnson: 
Q.: You did not advise the State Engineer's office that the ponds 
themselves were no longer used or hadn't been used for a long time? 
A.: No. I basically informed them that we need to make an upgrade. They 
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gave me the chance to abandon it at that time. I says, Well, geez, I 
don't want to abandon it. You know, we've had this easement, you 
know, for years, and I didn't want to abandon it. And I took the proper 
steps to secure the water right and to fix it up. 
Russell's handwritten reply to the State Engineer's letter speaks in the future tense, 
and it begins: "I would like to use the blue lakes and am willing to repair or put in new the 
following which will make the dam safe and useable [sic]. . . . (2) put in a spillway if 
needed, I feel the water would never overflow if I was to use it." Tr. Exh. 51. 
On cross-examination, Russell Johnson further testified as follows: 
A.: I've personally witnessed water flowing through these water courses 
into the Blue Lakes. 
Q.: When did you first witness that? 
A.: As long as I've been alive, I cannot remember a time when at least the 
flood waters did not flow into Blue Lakes, for as long as I can 
remember. Say back at least ten years, I can remember going down in 
this area swimming, hunting, trapping muskrats. These ditches were 
there and they were flowing into the Blue Lakes. 
Q.: Was anybody diverting that flood water into those—into that upper-the 
most southerly portion? 
A.: At ten years old, I don't know if they were or were not. From my 
knowledge and my study, yes, people were diverting water into the 
Blue Lakes. 
Q.: Do you have any knowledge of anybody diverting water into that 
upper—into this most southerly portion that you depicted on your 
illustrative map? 
A.: From approximately the time I can recollect, ten years old, yes. 
Q.: Who was doing that? 
A.: I'm not aware of who was doing it. 
Q.: So you don't know that anybody was directing water into that area, do 
you? 
A.: I seen the water going in. Whether they directed it whether it was not 
directed, I have no idea. I remember water going in there. 
Q.: Okay. So just water that was running free; is that correct? 
A.: I have no knowledge if it's running free or it was diverted. 
Q.: Was it in a ditch? 
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A.: Yes. Some was, some was not. 
Q.: Okay. Whenever it flooded, why, water would run to the low spot and 
that was a low spot; is that correct?. 
A.: Yes. This has been a flood drainage area. It's a low spot. All the 
water basically come to that area. 
R. at 558, pp. 207-209. 
While Russell claimed and believed that his predecessors stored water in the Blue 
Lakes during and before the 1940fs, and into the 1950fs, he acknowledged that he had no 
personal knowledge that they did so, nor did he have any idea of the volume or dates. R. at 
558, 219. Russell Johnson further admitted that he never diverted any Fishing Creek water 
into the south lake, and didn't know whether anyone else ever had. R. at 558, pp. 209, 214. 
Russell Johnson, the only one of the two plaintiffs to give any testimony at trial, could 
only recall putting Fishing Creek water into any other of the Blue Lakes on only two 
occasions, during years he couldn't pinpoint, sometime earlier than ten years before trial, 
when he simply flushed out the northerly pond, apparently without taking any affirmative 
action to ever store any water there. R. at 558, pp. 217-18. Russell further stated that it was 
probably in 1986, or 11 years before trial, when the north pond was last full or stored water, 
and that the decision to not use the north pond since then to store any water, but to use it 
instead only as route of "bypass", was deliberate to avoid evaporation losses, although he 
thought that at some future time he might want to store water there. R. at 557, pp. 37-38. 
Thus, Plaintiffs conceded that from 1986 on, the only significant water accumulated only in 
the south lake. 
Russell testified that he personally did not control sewer or flood waters which 
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naturally accumulated in the Blue Lakes, and never diverted any water into the Blue Lakes 
except in the attenuated sense, after 1986, that he had the legal right to "divert" sewer water 
into the Blue Lakes which ran from property of Grantsville City into the south pond, 
apparently without any particular physical effort from Russell or his family or other agent 
thereof. R. at 558, pp. 216-17. 
Not until June of 1986 did Plaintiff Russell Johnson file an application to appropriate 
the Grantsville City sewer pond effluent and to store it in the Blue Lakes. Tr. Exh. 50 
(Application no. A61838). The 1986 application was approved by the Utah State Engineer 
but limited to only .39 cfs (cubic feet per second, which is 24 acre feet per 31 day month and 
23.4 acre feet per 30 day month, as calculated from conversion tables shown in trial exhibit 
33). Tr. Exh. 16. Although the outflow from the sewer ponds periodically exceeds .39 cfs, 
the excess outflow is unappropriated public water which flows to the Great Salt Lake. Tr. 
Exh 53, R. at 170-71. The total capacity of the South Blue Lakes Reservoir is 230 acre feet. 
R. at 557, p. 37; Tr. Exh. 16. 
Thus, it would take almost 10 months of continuous influx of sewer water at the full 
rate allowed to Russell Johnson with no evaporation to completely fill the south pond. This 
never happened. Only in or about 1986, after the floods of 1983, did Plaintiffs use the 
backhoe of their cousin Alan Johnson to do a little dike work, plug holes, they trapped out 
some muskrats and installed a new outlet from the South Blue Lakes Reservoir to control the 
water flow through that dike and across the almost dry bottom land of the north pond over 
land of Higleys and then others to Plaintiffs' property where Plaintiffs used the sewer 
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effluent for irrigation. R. at 557, 558, pp. 30-31, 376. Russell admitted that as of March 
1990, the new outlet pipe would have been underwater and likely not visible from a surface 
view, and that the old Wrathall diversions works at the dike didn't work. R. at 558, pp. 327-
29. 
Howard Clegg, a former owner of the Blue Lakes from 1970 to about 1990, when 
asked if anyone put any water into the Blue Lakes while he owned them, said: 
The only water when we owned it was water that would raise in the spring on the 
ground above. Depending on how wet the year was, it would run some water down 
into the Blue Lakes. But they were washed out and stored a little bit of water, but not 
much. Enough to show there was water around. 
R. at 561, pp. 714-15. 
The 1986 application for storage of sewer water was made and approved without 
anyone ever seeking or obtaining consent from the owners of the servient land. R. at 559, 
561, pp.478-79, 714-16, 823. In fact, when Russell's counsel asked him whether he or his 
father ever sought permission of the landowner to store water in the Blue Lakes or to operate 
or maintain them, he said no and added, when asked if that operation was done under a claim 
of entitlement: "I—my understanding was that he [Russell's father, Max Johnson] had an 
easement and he was working under that easement." R. at 559, pp. 478-79. Russell also 
testified that he believed that he [Russell] had permission of the landowners to store water 
in the Blue Lakes until that permission was withdrawn by Arthur Higley in 1995. R. at 557, 
558, pp. 76,231. After it was approved and later certificated in about 1992, through the time 
of trial, Russell Johnson's right to store water in the Blue Lakes arising from his 1986 
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application was the only valid water storage right in the Blue Lakes granted by the State 
Engineer's office, although Arthur Higley also had an application pending with but not yet 
approved by that same office at the time of trial to store naturally occurring waters in the 
Blue Lakes. R. at 557, pp. 150-51; Tr. Exh. 16. 
While Alan Johnson, a first cousin to Plaintiffs, who was not born until 1962, also 
testified that "Russell and the Johnsons have always—have used that Wrathall reservoir," the 
only foundation for that testimony was that Alan had been "running cattle down there since 
either 1990 or '91." R. at 558, pp. 367, 371-2, 376. 
Similarly, Cory Brown, who was only 37 years old at the time of trial, or born about 
1960, said that for as long as he could remember, about 30 years, the Blue Lakes had been 
"used" by the Johnsons, and that during that time, he had witnessed water being taken from 
the Blue Lakes into a ditch taking water from the reservoir to the Johnson property, "mostly 
continuous, except for a couple of dry years." R. at 559, pp. 449-51. Cory also said that 
local kids used to use the reservoir for ice skating and recreation, and that when Cory was 
little he saw Russell's and Peter's father "use the reservoir." Id at 451. On cross-
examination, Cory clarified that prior to three or four years before trial, the ditch coming out 
of the reservoir only had water in it when it was spring or a wet part of the year, that he saw 
Plaintiffs father cleaning the ditch coming out of the reservoir at least once at an earlier but 
unspecified time, but that he had only seen Russell cleaning ditches and putting in headgates 
in that area "just in the last ten years." R. at 559, 458-60. 
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Is the Higley Purchase of Blue Lakes land Subject to Notice of any Use of 
Johnsons? Higleys concede they had notice in 1990, when they purchased the land at issue, 
that Paul Wrathall had been given the Easement recorded in 1946 to store water in the 
original Blue Lakes on part of that land Higleys were purchasing. Tr. Exh 22. But Higleys 
had no actual notice that Wrathall had executed the Agreement, then 44 years old, purporting 
to assign a 50% interest in that Easement, claiming to grant to Plaintiffs' father a right to use 
and store water with Paul Wrathall in the Blue Lakes. R. at 561, p. 823. That assignment 
Agreement never was recorded at the county recorder's office until Plaintiff Russell Johnson 
caused to it be so first recorded in 1995, after the parties began disputing each other's storage 
rights, and five years after Higleys recorded their purchase of the underlying land. R. at 558, 
pp. 253-4; R. at 561, pp. 823-24; Tr. Exh. 11 (reproduced at Tab 3 of Addendum). 
Johnsons contended at trial that Higleys are chargeable with notice of the assignment 
Agreement by virtue of the following: (1) a copy of that Agreement was included as an 
exhibit in the microfilmed records of the Third District Court of the 1950 litigation (Tr. Exh. 
10), (2) that files of the dam safety section of the State Engineer's office contained the 
originals of trial exhibit 18, the 1946-7 design plans for new proposed dikes, showing the 
name of the reservoir to be formed thereby as "Wrathall-Johnson" (R. at 557, p. 157; Tr. 
Exh. 18), a name also sometimes used to refer to the Blue Lakes by Johnsons, their cousin 
Alan Johnson, and Cory Brown, a Grantsville resident who acknowledged that only people 
in a little part of Grantsville knew it by that name, who also stated that most Grantsville 
residents knew the ponds only by the name "Blue Lakes"( R. at 559, p.449), (3) that the 
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policy of title insurance given to Higleys contained a standard exception for unrecorded 
rights or claims, including easements, of persons in possession or claiming to be in 
possession of the lands (Tr. Exh. 22), and (4) finally that a careful on-site inspection would 
have shown that there was a water conveyance "structure" leading out of the most northerly 
Blue Lakes to an extension of the west turn of the Fishing Creek irrigation ditch which 
connects to ditches leading to the Johnson ranch, and that there was water flowing into and 
out of the Blue Lakes in March, 1990. 
Higleys responded at trial that constructive notice to them, who were not parties to the 
1950 litigation, can only be given by documents recorded in the county recorder's office, not 
documents on file elsewhere (R. at 562, p. 874), and that any 1990 on-site inspection only 
showed, as Russell Johnson admitted, that the "watercourse" leading into the northerly Blue 
Lake from the Fishing Creek ditch was only a swale or natural low depression in the ground 
(R. at 558, p. 201), that the "sewer ditch" leading out of the northerly Blue Lake was only 
a scar of an old, apparently abandoned ditch from decades before (R. at 559, p. 499), that said 
"sewer ditch" connected to another ditch carrying Fishing Creek water to a variety of users, 
including Johnsons (R. at 559, 562, pp. 499-501, 875), and that only by setting headgates in 
a certain fashion would the water flow to the Johnsons as opposed to others. R. at 562, p. 875 
Also, other long-time Grantsville residents, including Arthur Higley and his cousin Sherman 
Higley, who was called by Plaintiffs to testify against Defendants Higley and was adverse 
to Arthur and had a lawsuit then pending against Arthur (R. at 561, p. 814), knew the Blue 
Lakes only by that term, and were not familiar with them being called the Wrathall-Johnson 
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Reservoir. R. at 559, 560, pp. 497, 600. 
However, even if one believes, as the trial court apparently did from its Finding of 
Fact no. 49, that Higleys had actual or constructive notice in 1990 of the 1946 assignment 
Agreement, none of that makes any legal difference if that Agreement was still legally 
invalid, as an unenforceable attempt to sever a part of an easement appurtenant without 
conveying any part of the dominant estate benefitted by the easement, and for other reasons 
presented in Higleys' motion for summary judgment before trial, as explained in the 
Argument below. 
Arthur Higley's Discovery of and Objection to Johnsons' Use of Blue Lakes. 
Arthur testified that he did not learn that the Johnsons were using Higleys' land to store water 
in the Blue Lakes until he had a discussion with Russell Johnson on that point a year or two 
after Higleys purchased the land. R. at 559, p. 518. When Arthur first learned that, he made 
no immediate objection, trying to be a good neighbor to Russell and to help him. R. at 559, 
p. 519. This continued until 1995, when Arthur refused to let him use it anymore because 
of Russell's demands and threats. R. at 557, 559, p. 76, 520. In 1995 or 1996, a tug of war 
between them began when alternately one would plug the hole in the dike to keep water in 
the south lake, and the other would soon remove the plug. R. at 559, pp. 520-21. 
The Higley Well Waters and Johnsons5 Claims of Flooding. The "Higley Wells" 
are artesian wells which flow without pumping and which have flowed unabated year around 
since the early 1950's. Defendant Arthur Higley owns only a 1/6 interest in the Higley 
Wells, and the remaining ownership is held jointly by Sherman Higley, Rulon Higley, Lester 
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Higley, Lynn Higley or his mother Lorna Higley, and Steven St. Clair. R. at 557, 561, pp. 
47, 171-72, 748, & 814. The water from the Higley Wells runs into the "Higley Ditch" 
which is owned by the owners of the water produced by the Higley Wells, the "Higley Wells 
Association." Id. 
Until the fall of 1996, the water ran in the Higley Ditch about three miles until it 
passed the corrals, hay stack yard, chutes, and road which Plaintiffs claimed were damaged 
by flooding to the location of the two headgates where the flow of the water could be 
changed to divert the water for the use of Sherman and Lester Higley or into another ditch 
owned by Arthur Higley, Rulon Higley, Steven St. Clair, and Lynn Higley. R. at 557, pp. 
44-47; Tr. Exh. 14. 
In the fall of 1996, a diversion ditch was constructed to allow the water from the 
Higley Ditch to flow in the ditch across land owned by Steven St. Clair where it flows into 
a new pipeline owned by Steven St. Clair, which runs across Plaintiffs' property pursuant to 
an easement granted by Plaintiffs to Defendant Arthur Higley as well as to Rulon Higley and 
to Steven St. Clair, and which at times is used by all six of the owners of the Higley Wells. 
R. at 557, p. 52, 561, p. 770; Tr. Exh. 15. 
In January and March of 1996, Plaintiff Russell Johnson testified that his corral and 
hay stack yard were flooded by water from the Higley Ditch. R. at 557, 558, pp. 58-65, 
267-79. 
In late 1995 and early 1996, for about two months, Rulon and Arthur Higley put 
Higley Well water into the South Blue Lake. R. at 561, pp. 671-72. This was done again 
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in the summer of 1996 while Steven St. Clair's new pipeline was being put on Russell 
Johnson's land. R. at 561, pp. 673-74, 764-65. In or about August, 1996, Rulon Higley 
released the water stored in the Blue Lakes reservoir while Arthur Higley was on vacation 
out of the state of Utah. R. at 561, pp. 676-77, 765-66 . There had been prior conversations 
between Arthur and Rulon about their desire to use their Higley well water which they had 
put in the Blue Lakes, but no definite direction was given by Arthur to Rulon to release that 
water at the time and in the fashion it was. R. at 559, pp. 529-31. Russell Johnson claimed 
that the water so released was all his, and that it consisted of at least 100 acre feet, because 
the reservoir was half-full. R. at 557, 559, pp. 77, 80,129,424. There was no sewer effluent 
placed into the Blue Lakes in the months of March, June, September or October, 1996. Tr. 
Exh. 53. Arthur testified that just before he left on vacation, there was only one to one and 
one-half feet in the bottom of the reservoir which could have later been drained out, and that 
the lake was not half-full, but contained less than 100 acre feet and that none of the water so 
drained out belonged to Russell because Russell had lost his water when Russell 
commingled his water with that of the Higleys without permission from defendants to use 
the land for storing it. R. at 559, pp. 531-535. 
Plaintiffs also claim and the trial court found that Defendant Arthur Higley alone is 
liable for the damages from water which flowed onto their land during the winter of 1996-
1997 from land of Steven St. Clair, when natural storm and winter runoff water, combined 
with Higley Wells Association water being introduced into the head of the new pipeline 
which was paid for and owned solely by Steven St. Clair, did not all flow into that pipeline. 
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R. at 557, 561, pp. 69-72, 802-03. This claimed liability is based on Arthur's role in using 
a hand held calculator to help determine the size of the pipe for that pipeline ( R. at 559, pp. 
563, 568-70), notwithstanding that the trial court's site inspection in September 1997 showed 
the pipe was accepting and carrying all the Association water from the Higley wells, and 
ignoring the testimony of Arthur Higley that Rulon Higley helped size the pipe and that Mr. 
St. Clair also independently sized the pipeline using his own computer program and had sole 
veto power over how much he was willing and able to spend for that pipeline. R. at 559, 
561, pp. 568-70, 763-64, 772-3, 808-09. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Wrathall's purported grant to Maxwell Johnson of a storage easement in the Blue 
Lakes was legally ineffective and conveyed nothing. An appurtenant easement runs with the 
land and is unassignable except as part of the transfer of the dominant estate. Indeed, an 
appurtenant easement has no existence apart from the dominant estate and cannot be 
separated from, or transferred independently of it. In 1946, Paul Wrathall was granted an 
easement to certain lands in order to store water thereon. Mr. Wrathall then attempted to 
grant a one-half undivided interest in his easement to Plaintiffs' father, Maxwell Johnson. 
As he did not convey to Mr. Johnson any interest in the land to which this easement was 
appurtenant, however, the grant fails as a matter of law. 
Defendants were bona fide purchasers without notice, and were not subject to 
Wrathall's purported grant of easement to Maxwell Johnson. A purchaser is considered 
apprised of those facts obvious from inspection, but here there were no obvious indications 
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of adverse use on the property sufficient to impose a duty of inquiry. Nor can Defendants 
be charged with constructive knowledge of the purported grant, since it was recorded in 
1995, five years after Defendants' purchase of the land had been recorded. 
Plaintiffs cannot claim a prescriptive easement since they cannot show and have not 
shown 20 years of open, continuous, and adverse use of Defendants' land under a claim of 
right by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiffs' father's use began permissively. The 
easement was an easement in land, not water, the only involvement of Defendants' 
predecessors in interest being their consent that water be stored on the land; they had no 
interest in the water's source nor its destination, and the fact that Wrathall sought to share 
the stored water by attempting to convey an interest in his easement is entirely irrelevant to 
the fact that the easement was permissive. Even if Plaintiffs' use had at some point become 
adverse, they never asserted this adversity nor brought it to the notice of the servient estate 
owners until 1995, when relations between Plaintiffs and Defendants first became strained. 
Plaintiffs' use was neither open nor continuous. Plaintiffs' "storage" was nothing but 
the natural accumulation of water in the Blue Lakes. This water spilled around the south 
dike, into the North Lake, and thence down the scar of an old ditch and into the irrigation 
system. If properly set, the headgates turned the water into a lateral ditch and so onto 
Plaintiffs' land. Prior to 1986, however, when Russell Johnson applied with the State 
Engineer's office for water-storage rights to the sewer effluent flowing out of the Grants ville 
sewer lagoons, Plaintiffs had admittedly not used the Blue Lakes for many years. Between 
some time prior to 1960 and Russell Johnson's 1986 application, there is no evidence that 
81776 HI321 002 27 
the Johnsons diverted any water into the South Blue Lake. Thus, for at least 26 years, the 
purported easement was not being used at all. Plaintiffs' use has clearly not been continuous. 
Plaintiffs cannot preclude Defendants from storing water on their own land. The 
owner of a servient estate has all the rights and benefits of ownership, subject only to the 
terms of the easement. Even if Plaintiffs had an easement, Defendants could still store water 
in the Blue Lakes unless and until such storage displaces Plaintiffs' certificated water, filling 
the South Lake and spilling Plaintiffs' water. The reservoir, however, has not been filled to 
capacity since 1986 or earlier. 
Plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. The trial court failed to set forth in its 
findings the requisite specific facts and reasoning, demonstrating a careful balancing of 
equities, leading to the clear conclusion that a party is or is not necessary or indispensable. 
Relying instead on confused and irrelevant assertions in Plaintiffs' memorandum in 
opposition to Defendants motion to join such parties, the court ignored the fact that 
Wrathall's purported grant to Johnson was legally ineffective, the Wrathall easement had 
passed to his successors, each of whom may now claim an undivided interest therein, and 
whose interests have been seriously curtailed by the outcome below. In addition, the six 
owners of interests in the Higley Wells all bear the same responsibility for the water in the 
Higley Ditch, which allegedly flooded Plaintiffs' lands. 
Arthur Higley cannot be held solely liable for the 1996-97 flooding. In the fall of 
1996, a 20-inch pipeline was laid across Plaintiffs' land to carry Higley Well water to Higley 
land, and to avert future flooding. Paid for entirely by Steven St. Clair, all aspects of the 
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pipeline's construction were subject to his sole veto. For various reasons, beginning in 
November of 1996, the water directed into the pipe overflowed onto Plaintiffs' land. The 
trial court conducted a site inspection in September 1997 and found that the pipe accepted 
and carried the entire Higley Wells flow, but Plaintiffs assert that the pipe was too small. 
Arthur Higley was held solely liable for damages based on his sizing of the pipe. Mr. St. 
Clair, however, also sized the pipe, and given his full veto power, Arthur Higley cannot be 
held responsible for any overflow: on the contrary Mr. St. Clair was ultimately responsible 
for its size, and the pipe is sufficiently large in any case. 
In August, 1996, unknown to the vacationing Arthur Higley, Rulon Higley released 
stored Higley Well water from the South Blue Lake to irrigate Higley land. Plaintiffs claim 
that this water totaled some 100 acre-feet, and belonged to Russell Johnson. But Johnson's 
water right permits him only 24 acre-feet per month, and unless he used no water at all for 
four months, and none of it evaporated in the summer heat, he could not possibly have had 
100 acre-feet in the South Lake when Rulon Higley released the stored water. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PAUL WRATHALL'S PURPORTED ASSIGNMENT TO MAXWELL JOHNSON OF AN 
INTEREST IN THE EASEMENT GRANTED TO WRATHALL BY DEFENDANTS5 
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST IS UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
A. The 1946 Conveyance from Wrathall to Johnson Was Legally Ineffective. 
As a general rule, "an easement can be used only in connection with the estate to 
which it is appurtenant and cannot be extended by the dominant estate owner to property 
owned by others unless so provided in the instrument by which the easement is created." 
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Ridell v. EwelL 929 P.2d 30, 32 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). Accord Weber v. Johnston Fuel 
Liners. Inc.. 519 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1974) (holding that the instrument creating the 
easement at issue created an easement appurtenant which could not be separated from the 
dominant estate; therefore, an attempt to convey the easement was "of no legal effect and 
ineffective to convey any interest therein or title thereto."); Brown v. Voss. 715 P.2d 514, 
517 (Wash. 1986) ("If an easement is appurtenant to a particular parcel of land, any extension 
thereof to other parcels is a misuse of the easement." (citing Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto. 
Wheaton. 220 N.E.2d 491 (111. App. 1966); Robertson v. Robertson. 197 S.E.2d 183 (Va. 
1973); and Penn Bowling Rec. Ctr.. Inc. v. Hot Shoppes. Inc.. 179 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir. 1949)); 
Luevano v. Group One. 779 P.2d 552, 554 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Kikta v. Hughes. 
766 P.2d 321 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) ("[A]n easement appurtenant... is deemed to run with 
the land and is unassignable in the absence of a transfer of the dominant estate"); Burns v. 
Alderman. 838 P.2d 878, 882 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (citing Nelson v. Johnson. 679 P.2d 662 
(Idaho 1984)) ("An easement appurtenant must bear some relation to the use of the dominant 
estate and is incapable of existence separate from it; any attempted severance from the 
dominant estate must fail."); 25 Am.Jur.2d "Easements and Licenses" § 103, p. 675 ("An 
appurtenant easement cannot be separated from, or transferred independently of, the land to 
which it is appurtenant."). 
In Kikta v. Hughes. 766 P.2d 321 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), for example, the Abrahams 
granted an express easement to Gonzales, who owned a contiguous tract, in 1956. Ten years 
later, the Abrahams deeded the southern section of their tract to the Hughes. Two years after 
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this, in 1968, the Abrahams sold the remaining northern section of their land to the Kiktas. 
In 1975, the Kiktas withdrew permission for the Hughes to cross their land. In 1982, the 
Gonzaleses executed an assignment purporting to grant to Hughes "a permanent and 
perpetual right of easement. . . . to the property now owned by Mildred Kitka [sic]." In 
1983, the Kiktas filed a quiet title action. Hughes counterclaimed, arguing both actual and 
constructive notice as well as prescription. The trial court quieted title in the Kiktas and 
Hughes appealed. 
The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that "[tjhere must be unity of title in the 
same person to both the dominant estate and the appurtenant easement claimed," 766 P.2d 
at 323 (citation omitted), and that the Gonzaleses had not passed title to the dominant estate 
to the Hughes along with the purported assignment of easement rights. Moreover, the court 
pointed out, since the owner of the dominant estate cannot change the extent of the easement 
as contemplated by the original grant, the owner of the dominant estate has no power to 
convey the use of an easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another. Id. 
(citing Stout v. Christian. 593 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Ricelli v. Atkinson. 132 
N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); and Brooks v. Tanner. 680 P.2d 343 (N.M. 1984)). 
In the present case, the two instruments creating the easement at issue—one from J. 
Keith and Elba H. Brown and one from Penina W. Anderson, both attached hereto at Tab 2 
of the Addendum—employ nearly identical language, and neither purports to create any right 
in Mr. Wrathall to sever and convey his easement or any part or portion thereof to property 
owned by another. The Brown easement, for example, declares as follows: 
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J. Keith Brown and Elba H. Brown, his wife, grantors of Grantsville, 
Tooele County, State of Utah, hereby give, grant and transfer to Paul E. 
Wrathall, his successors in interest and assigns, Grantee, of the same place, for 
and in consideration of the sum of $1.00, and other good and valuable 
consideration, have granted, bargained, transferred and delivered and by these 
presents do grant, bargain, transfer and deliver unto Paul E. Wrathall, his 
successors in interest and assigns, an unconditional easement and right in and 
to the following described real property in Tooele County, State of Utah, to 
wit: 
The Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter and the North 
half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range 5 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, and the Southwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 5 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres more or less, or 
so much thereof as shall be necessary and convenient for the use 
hereinafter set forth, but shall not exceed the natural reservior 
[sic] basin. 
For the purpose of storing water thereupon, giving and granting unto the said 
Paul E. Wrathall, his successors in interest and assigns, the unconditional 
easement and use of so much of said above described land as will be covered 
and occupied by the storage of water therein and thereon, sufficient to contain 
waters run thereupon the the [sic]2 natural course thereof, in storing said water, 
together with the right of ingress and egress necessary for the full and 
complete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted and 
all rights and privileges incident thereto including the right to build, repair and 
maintain said storage reservior [sic] basin. 
This easement shall be in force and effect perpetually. 
Undeterred by the fact that it was legally impossible for him to convey an interest in 
his easement without conveying an interest in the dominant estate (i.e., his land), Mr. 
Wrathall executed the Agreement of May 14, 1946, attached at Tab 3 of the Addendum, 
purporting to grant to Maxwell A. Johnson "an undivided one-half interest in the easement." 
The Agreement grants no interest in the lands owned by Wrathall, nor in any portion thereof. 
2
 The Anderson grant clarifies that this language should be "in the." 
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Like the Gonzales easement in Kikta. the easement in the present dispute is clearly an 
easement appurtenant, inasmuch as the original 1946 easement from the Browns and 
Anderson to Wrathall was "created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in 
his use of the land." Weber. 519 P.2d at 975 (quoting Restatement of Property § 453). Like 
the Gonzaleses, Wrathall attempted to convey the easement, or in this case a one-half 
undivided interest therein, without conveying title to the dominant estate to which the 
easement is appurtenant. Such a conveyance must fail as a matter of law. 
B. Defendants Were Bona Fide Purchasers Without Notice. 
It is well established that a purchaser will be charged with notice of an interest 
adverse to his title when he is aware of facts which would lead a reasonably 
prudent person to a course of investigation which, properly executed, would 
lead to a knowledge of the servitude. 
Methonen v. Stone. 941 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Alaska 1997) (numerous citations omitted). This 
means, essentially, that "[t]he purchaser is considered apprised of those facts obvious from 
an inspection of the property." IdL (citing various cases). 
In the present case, however, a 1990 inspection of the property revealed no apparent 
easement. Russell Johnson told no one he was storing water, and there was nothing there to 
show he was. (See R. at 558, p. 224.) The Blue Lakes themselves, unchanged since the early 
1950s save for some minor repair work in 1986, gave no evidence of an easement; the new 
outlet pipe was under water and not visible; old diversion works were inoperable; the scar 
of the old ditch, down which water naturally escaping from the lakes often passed anyway, 
gave no hint of an adverse use. As the water reached the Fishing Creek ditch, it fed into a 
network of ditches farther down serving more land owners than just the Johnsons. None of 
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this was in any way new or different or out of the ordinary, and inspection of the property 
thus revealed no "facts obvious" enough to impose a duty of inquiry. And indeed, the last 
Arthur Higley had heard, Wrathall had stopped using the water around 1950 because it was 
too alkaline. Thus, far from having reason to believe any easement existed in Plaintiffs, 
Arthur Higley had express reason to believe the contrary to be true. 
Of course, a purchaser, whether of land or of water, may also be considered to have 
had constructive notice under the recording laws. See Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-2(1) 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3, an unrecorded document "is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent 
purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and (2) the 
subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." The purported grant by Wrathall 
to Maxwell Johnson was not recorded until 1995, five years after the recording of the 
conveyance to Defendants' of the land containing the Blue Lakes. 
Plaintiffs assert, however, that Defendants were on notice because the Wrathall-
Johnson Agreement was in the Third District Court archives as part of the records of the 
1950 lawsuit, or because the State Engineer's files contained the 1946-47 proposed dike 
plans. As to the former assertion, Defendants were not parties to that suit, and cannot be 
charged with notice thereof, to say nothing of the exhibits offered in connection therewith. 
The latter assertion is irrelevant: Utah law imposes no duty to check the State Engineer's 
files for evidence suggesting the possibility of water storage easements when purchasing 
property. 
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The only mechanism by which Plaintiffs could have put Defendants on constructive 
notice was the Tooele County Recorders Office—a mechanism which they failed to use. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT USED DEFENDANTS9 LAND OPENLY, ADVERSELY, OR 
CONTINUOUSLY, LONG ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION. 
A party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that his use of another's land was 
open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. Valcarce 
v. Fitzgerald. 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 70 (Utah 1997) (citing Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah 
22, 197 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948)). The claimant must prove the necessary elements by 
clear and convincing evidence, Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citing Garmond v. Kinnev. 579 P.2d 178, 178 (N.M. 1978)), but the use will be 
presumed to have been adverse if the claimant can show open and continuous use under 
claim of right for the twenty-year prescriptive period. Valcarce. 331 Utah Adv. Rep. at 70 
(citing Zollinger v. Frank. 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1946)). However, this 
presumption cannot arise "under mere use by a licensee and knowledge of such use on the 
part of the licensor." Green v. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
Lunt v. Kitchens. 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953)). Use, moreover, cannot be construed as 
adverse "when it rests upon license or mere neighborly accommodation," id (citing Lunt, 
260 P.2d at 538); see also Griffiths v. Archibald. 272 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1954) (Wade, J., 
dissenting). 
In Green, for example, which concerned the legal status of an irrigation ditch running 
across four contiguous parcels of land, one Howard Miller and his father, who owned one 
of the parcels, dug the ditch in 1947 or 1948 with the permission of the adjoining 
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landowners. They also extended the ditch to convey their excess water across the land of one 
Harold Jensen to another parcel owned by the Millers. This parcel was later conveyed to the 
Stansfields. 
Mr. Jensen's heirs sold his parcel to a Mr. Green, who built a pond to collect the water 
flowing across his land so as to water his cattle. His pond, however, prevented water from 
flowing through the irrigation ditch to the Stansfield parcel. Mr. Stansfield allegedly entered 
Green's property with a backhoe and breached the pond. Green filed suit, seeking damages 
and an injunction to prevent the Stansfields from entering his land and interfering with the 
water in the pond. The Stansfields counterclaimed, asserting that they had a superior right 
to the water and requesting the declaration of an easement across Green's land. Green, 
however, argued that an easement could not arise because Green's predecessor in interest, 
Harold Jensen, had granted permission to the Millers to dig the ditch across his land, and 
without adverse use, there could be no prescriptive easement. The trial court granted Green's 
motion and the Stansfields appealed. 
Affirming, this Court cited various cases from other jurisdictions, explaining that 
[wjhen a party's use of property is permissive at its inception, the use cannot 
ripen into a prescriptive right unless there is a later distinct assertion of a right 
hostile to the owner, which is brought to the attention of the owner, and the use 
is continued for the full prescriptive period. 
Green. 886 P.2d at 120 (quoting Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 610 P.2d 
1149, 1152 (Mont. 1980), and citing City of Anchorage v. Nesbett 530 P.2d 1324, 1329 
(Alaska 1975) and Scheller v. Pierce County. 104 P. 277, 278 (Wash. 1909)). "The 
proponent of a change from permissive to adverse use," this Court explained, "must assert 
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such a right to the owner. Without such an assertion, adverse use cannot arise." Green. 886 
P.2datl21. 
A. Plaintiffs' Original Use was Permissive. 
It is important to note that the easement granted to Paul Wrathall in 1946 was an 
easement to some 160 acres of land. The easement is not a grant of water, but of land upon 
which to store water. Paul Wrathall was granted a right to use certain land upon which to 
store his water while not in use. Plainly, Mr. Wrathall's use of this land was permissive. 
Unaware that it was legally ineffective, Mr. Wrathall gave to Maxwell Johnson an 
undivided half interest in this easement interest. That the Browns and Anderson knew of this 
purported assignment is a matter of record: they were named defendants who appeared and 
were represented by counsel in the 1950 case of Castagno & Johnson et al. v. Wrathall et al. 
(Civil No. 3559), in which the Agreement between Wrathall and Johnson was introduced as 
an exhibit. 
The Browns and Anderson, in other words, permitted a certain amount of water to be 
stored on their land "not [to] exceed the natural reserv[oi]r basin." Whence the water came 
to the burdened land, so long as it was "run thereupon [in] the natural course thereof," was 
not important. Whither it went was the affair of Paul Wrathall. The headgate which must 
be turned to direct the flows to either Wrathall's land or Johnson's was located on property 
which belonged to a third-party; the Browns and Anderson had nothing to do with what 
happened to the water once it left their land, and Mr. Wrathall's willingness to share with 
Maxwell Johnson, evidenced by a written document shared with and not objected to by the 
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original owners of the servient estate, shows that Johnson's use of the storage right was 
permissive. 
A simple illustration: let's say that X tells his neighbor Y, the owner of the house next 
to his, that Y can park a lawnmower in X's garage. Y lets his neighbor Z use the 
lawnmower. Y moves away, and gives Z the lawnmower. Z might continue to keep the 
lawnmower in X's garage without objection for many years, but he can hardly claim that the 
original parking of the lawnmower in X's garage was nonpermissive: under the rule set forth 
in Green v. Stansfield. the use of the garage "cannot ripen into a prescriptive right unless 
there is a later distinct assertion of a right hostile to the owner, which is brought to the 
attention of the owner, and the use is continued for the full prescriptive period." 886 P.2d 
at 120. 
Similarly, turning back to the present dispute, Plaintiffs never made any "distinct 
assertion of a right hostile to the owner," nor have they brought any such assertion "to the 
attention of the owner" nor even intimated any such claim until Arthur Higley protested 
Russell Johnson's change application to clear up a mistake on his Fishing Creek water in 
1995 (Record at 557, p.76). And it was not until shortly thereafter that Mr. Higley began 
repeatedly to plug the hole between the two dikes which Mr. Johnson repeatedly removed. 
There can, in other words, be no showing of actual adversity until at the earliest 1995. Prior 
to that, since the easement's inception in 1946, any water storage had been permissive. 
B. Plaintiffs9 Use of Blue Lakes Has Not Been Open and Continuous for 20 
Years, So the Presumption of Adversity Cannot Arise. 
The evidence does not support the trial court's finding of open and continuous use for 
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the required 20 year period. 
Although the fact that Plaintiffs' father's use of the easement began as a permissive 
use precludes any claim of an easement by prescription, Plaintiffs have also failed to show 
that their use of the easement, or their father's use, was or has ever been either "open" or 
"continuous" for the requisite 20 year prescriptive period. 
To establish an easement by prescription, the owner of the servient estate must 
actually know of the use of the purported easement and the claim of right under which it is 
used or the use must be so visible and open, so "notorious" that "in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence the owner should learn thereof." Jensen v. Gerrard. 39 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Utah 
1935); cf McGill v. Wahl. 839 P.2d 393, 397 (Alaska 1992); 25 Am.Jur.2d "Easements and 
Licenses" § 60. Here, however, although Defendants' predecessor in interest knew of Paul 
Wrathall's purported grant to Maxwell Johnson of a 50% interest in Wrathall's water-storage 
easement, there is little if any evidence that anyone knew or saw that it was being used. And 
indeed, as Russell Johnson himself admitted, for "many years" it had not. (See Tr. Exh. 23.) 
Following the 1950 litigation, the south dikes were constructed, impounding what is 
now the South Blue Lake. The dike impounding the water in the North Blue Lakes washed 
out at some point prior to 1960. In 1986, Russell Johnson applied with the State Engineer's 
office for water rights to the sewer effluent discharging out of the Grantsville sewer lagoons 
and flowing into the South Blue Lake. But between the south dike construction and the north 
dike failure prior to 1960 and Johnson's 1986 application, there is no evidence of any kind 
that the Johnsons diverted water from any source into the South Blue Lake. Russell Johnson 
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apparently diverted Fishing Creek water through the North Blue Lakes basin once or twice 
to "flush them out," but the only water flowing into the South Blue Lake between the time 
prior to 1960 and the mid-1980s was natural runoff. 
Even if Plaintiffs' father had used the Blue Lakes for water storage continuously from 
1946 all the way through 1960, the latest date when diversion into the Blue Lakes evidently 
ceased entirely (a period of not more than 15 years), this would not satisfy the 20-year 
prescriptive period. And Plaintiffs' alleged use herein, even if it had run without ceasing 
from 1987 (when Russell Johnson's application was approved) through the present (a period 
of about 12 years), would likewise not satisfy the prescriptive period. There is, moreover, 
a gap of at least 26 years between Maxwell Johnson's purported use (1946-60) and 
Plaintiffs' (1986-98). 
Whatever else it may be, Plaintiffs' use clearly has not been continuous. Neither has 
it been "open." Plaintiffs' "storage" between 1960 and 1986 consisted entirely of the natural 
accumulation of ordinary runoff. Plaintiffs did nothing at all to actively "store" any water 
in the Blue Lakes. They diverted no water, nor did they release any. The water accumulated 
by act of God in the South Blue Lake simply spilled around the dike on the South Lake and 
flowed into the lower North Lake basin, thence into the scar of the old ditch and into the 
Fishing Creek irrigation ditch north of the Blue Lakes. From there, assuming the headgates 
were set properly, the water flowed down into Plaintiffs' land. 
Such use is hardly "open"; indeed, it is hardly even "use." Making use of water which 
just happens to be flowing in your direction anyway cannot give rise to a presumption that 
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one is actively diverting, storing, and releasing water from a storage easement. The evidence 
simply does not bear out a finding of open, continuous use for the required 20 years. 
Plaintiffs have no prescriptive easement. 
C. Plaintiffs' Right to Store Water in the Blue Lakes, If Any, Cannot Operate 
to Deprive Defendants of All Storage Rights, and the Trial Court Exceeded 
its Discretion in So Ruling. 
Plaintiffs' interest in the Blue Lakes, if any, cannot preclude Defendants from storing 
water on their own land. The owner of a servient estate "has all the rights and benefits of 
ownership consistent with the easement; the right to use the land remains in him, without any 
express reservation to that effect, so far as such right does not conflict with the purpose and 
character of the easement." Wykoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758-59 (Utah 1982) (citing 25 
Am.Jur.2d "Easements and Licenses" § 89 (1966) and North Union Canal Co. v. Newell. 550 
P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1976) ("the owner of the fee title, because of his general ownership, 
should have the use and enjoyment of his property to the highest degree possible, not 
inconsistent with the easement.... the owner of the easement should likewise have the right 
to use and enjoy his easement to the fullest extent possible not inconsistent with the rights 
of the fee owner.")). 
Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs may have an easement interest in the 
Land upon which the Blue Lakes are situated, Defendants may nevertheless store water from 
the Higley Wells in the Blue Lakes and use that water as well as natural runoff into the Blue 
Lakes unless and until such storage displaces the water therein which Plaintiffs claim to have 
stored within the limits of Plaintiffs' certificated quantity. 
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In other words, to forestall Defendants' storage of Higley Well water in the Blue 
Lakes, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the addition of the Higley Well water has somehow 
displaced the approximately 24 acre-feet per month to which Russell Johnson's water right 
entitles him. Of course, this could only happen if the addition of the Higley Well water 
actually filled the South Lake entirely, spilling out Plaintiffs' water (as well as all other water 
therein). The South Blue Lake, however, has not been filled to capacity since 1986 or even 
earlier, and has occurred not once since Defendants began diverting Higley Well water into 
the Blue Lakes. Plainly, therefore, Russell Johnson cannot have been deprived of his 24 
acre-feet per month by the addition of the Higley Well water. 
As the owners in fee of the land upon which the Blue Lakes lie, Defendants have the 
right to use their land as they see fit, so long as the use is legal and does not interfere with 
Plaintiffs' easement (if such there be). Defendants' ability to place water into the Blue Lakes 
cannot be precluded by Plaintiffs' purported easement unless and until Defendants' water 
depletes Plaintiffs' storage space. As this has never occurred, Defendants retain the right to 
use the Blue Lakes for storage of the water from the Higley Wells. 
III. APPELLEES JOHNSON FAILED TO JOIN VARIOUS INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. 
Rule 19(a) & (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure3 imposes a two-part analysis 
3
 19(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
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for determining whether a party be indispensable: First, "[p]ursuant to subsection (a), 'a 
court must first determine whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the action to 
make it a necessary party,' considering the criteria set forth in the Rule." Seftel v. Capital 
City Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Manvgoats v. Kleppe. 558 F.2d 
556, 558 (10th Cir. 1977)). As set forth in the rule, these criteria are whether, 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc, Rule 19(a). If a party is deemed necessary, the court must then apply the 
analysis set forth in subsection (b) of the rule, to determine whether the party is sufficiently 
"necessary" to be "indispensable." This second analysis consists of four factors: 
(1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence will 
prejudice him or her or those already parties; 
(2) the likelihood of reducing or avoiding prejudice by protective 
measures or provisions in the judgment; 
of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a 
party. . . . 
(b) If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, 
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed 
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded 
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already 
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping 
of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will 
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
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(3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be entered in the person's 
absence, and 
(4) the adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc, Rule 19(b). Taking each of these factors into account, the court must 
determine "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed . . . or should 
be dismissed." Id 
A Rule 19 analysis requires the trial court to discuss in its findings "specific facts and 
reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is or is not necessary under rule 19(a) or 
indispensable under rule 19(b)." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 (citing Manygoats v. Kleppe. 558 
F.2d at 559). Failure to do so is error, id, although such an error may be harmless "if, upon 
a review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." 
SefteL 767 P.2d at 945 (citing Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1987) ("The 
findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" "Failure of the 
trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the 
record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment.' (citations omitted)). 
In the present case, the trial court denied the Higleys' motion to join certain parties 
as indispensable without discussing or even alluding to specific facts and reasoning as to 
either prong of the required analysis: necessity or indispensability. The findings state merely 
that 
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the court concludes that the nature of the claims set forth in plaintiffs' 
complaint do not require joinder of additional parties. This action grows solely 
out of the alleged conduct of defendants. Plaintiffs seek no relief against 
anyone other than defendants. 
(Record at 436-37.) The order ends with a reference to "the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' 
memorandum in opposition to said motion," but the Plaintiffs' memorandum is neither 
summarized nor outlined. But indeed, even if such a reference is permissible, Plaintiffs' 
memorandum is insufficient. It confuses easement with water-right, claiming that the 
"Wrathall joint interest in the easement appears to be owned by no one inasmuch as plaintiffs 
are the only recognized water storage right holder, according to the State Engineer's records" 
(Record at 77); it ignores the existence of joint interest in the water from the artesian flows' 
on Defendants' land; and it dismisses as irrelevant the fact that Plaintiffs' claim to the water-
storage easement must affect the interests of the true owners of the easement, the successors 
in interest to the land whereto the easement appertains. Plaintiffs' memorandum simply 
concludes that "plaintiffs seek no relief against anyone other than defendant Arthur Higley" 
and declares that "[i]f there is someone else out there, so be it. The judgment in this case will 
not bind them or prejudice their claim." The former assertion is irrelevant, since whom 
Plaintiffs seek relief from has no bearing on who must be joined; and the latter assertion is 
wrong. 
In any event, Utah law is quite clear that "abstract generalizations are not a substitute 
for the analysis required under Rule 19." SefteL 767 P.2d at 945 (citing Provident 
Tradesmen B. & T. Co. v. Patterson. 390 U.S. 102, 124 (1968)). And the trial court's 
findings are in fact mere abstract generalizations which fail to examine the elements required 
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for a determination of whether other parties may be necessary or indispensable. Certainly, 
the findings show none of the careful balancing of equities leading to the clear conclusion 
that the action might in good conscience proceed. 
In light of the inadequacy of the findings below, this Court must examine the record 
to determine whether the clear evidence supports the trial court's conclusion. SefteL 767 
P.2d at 945. Since WrathalFs purported conveyance to Maxwell Johnson of an undivided 
half interest in his easement was legally ineffective, the easement granted to Paul Wrathall 
by the Browns and Anderson in January of 1946, necessarily passed to those to whom 
Wrathall conveyed the land to which the easement is appurtenant. See, e ^ , Universal Motor 
Fuels. Inc. v. Johnston. 917 P.2d 877, 881-82 (Kan. 1996); Kikta. 766 P.2d at 323; Nelson. 
679 P.2d at 664; 25 Am.Jur.2d "Easements and Licenses" § 104. The members of this group 
may each claim an undivided interest in the entirety of the easement, including the 50% 
claimed by Plaintiffs under the ineffective conveyance. The interests of these individuals 
have clearly been unfairly curtailed by Plaintiffs' failure to join them, since their interest in 
the whole easement has essentially been eliminated by the rulings of the trial court. Even 
though Cory Brown, as a witness in open court, stated he was willing to abandon any interest 
he may have had in the easement, there was no determination made as to what portion of 
WrathalFs interest had passed to him, and another of Wrathall's successors, Rulon Higley, 
claimed in court that he desired to preserve his interest in the easement, notwithstanding he 
had only recently learned that he had any right to claim such an interest. In any other action 
which may be brought by those who own the land to which the easement is appurtenant, 
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Defendants' land may well be subjected by a decision in another court to a greater burden 
than was either granted or contemplated by the original grant of easement. 
The various holders of undivided interests in the water of the Higley wells—Arthur, 
Rulon, Sherman, Lester, and Lynn or Lorna Higley, and Steven St. Clair—are likewise 
indispensable parties. The water in the Higley Ditch, which allegedly flooded Johnson's 
lands, including the corral and haystack yard, belongs to and is the undivided responsibility 
of all six joint owners of an interest in the canal and the water therein. No one owner has any 
greater duty to Plaintiffs than have the others, nor does any have severable liability to 
Plaintiffs apart from the other owners. And indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel admitted in closing 
argument that "we did not prove that Mr. Higley was—that the defendant was the sole 
responsible party for this first flooding event. . . . that's something we just failed to prove." 
(R. at 562, pp. 870-71.) 
In addition, on most occasions that Plaintiff Russell Johnson complained of flooding, 
the water was not being used by Defendants. In January of 1996, it was Lynn Higley's water 
turn; in March of 1996, it was Sherman Higley's water turn; and in August of 1996, it was 
Sherman Higley's and Lester Higley's water turn. (Record at 84; Tr. Exh. 13.) The other 
owners of interest in the Higley Ditch and its water remain liable to suit and possibly to 
inconsistent results on this same issue. 
The trial court also held that Defendant Arthur Higley is liable for damages to 
Plaintiffs' land which occurred between November 1996 and summer of 1997 when water 
from storm and winter runoff, and Higley Association water did not all enter the new pipeline 
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(paid for and owned entirely by Steven St. Clair), and flowed instead onto Plaintiffs' 
property. Arthur Higley's liability is based solely on his having helped determine the size 
of the pipe. Mr. St. Clair, however, had independently sized the pipeline and had full control 
over the financing of the project. How Arthur Higley alone can equitably be held wholly 
liable for these damages is nowhere explained in the record. 
Plainly, under a Rule 19 analysis, nonjoinder of these parties left Mr. Arthur Higley 
and others "subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of [the] claimed interests]" of the several unjoined parties. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S RULING THAT DEFENDANT 
ARTHUR HIGLEY IS SOLELY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE 1996-97 FLOODING. 
In the fall of 1996, a diversion ditch was constructed to carry the water from the 
Higley Ditch across Steven St. Clair's land and into a 20-inch pipeline (laid in August 1996) 
which runs across Plaintiffs' land pursuant to an easement granted by Plaintiffs to Steven St. 
Clair, Rulon Higley, and Arthur Higley. One purpose of the diversion ditch and pipeline was 
to avert future flooding of the sort of which Plaintiffs had complained. (R. at 557, p. 52.) 
The material for the pipeline and its installation were paid for entirely by Steven St. Clair (R. 
at 559, p. 576), who had, as a result, sole veto power over all aspects of construction. All 
three of the easement holders—Arthur Higley, Rulon Higley, and Steven St. Clair—worked 
out solutions as to the appropriate size of the pipeline. Arthur Higley's calculation was made 
on a hand-held calculator, Mr. St. Clair's via computer program. Subject entirely to Mr. St. 
Clair's veto, both solutions indicated a 20-inch line would more than suffice, and a 20-inch 
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line was put in across Plaintiffs' land. 
During the winter of 1996-97, storm water, natural runoff, and Higley Wells 
Association water, flowing through the diversion ditch, did not all enter the pipeline and the 
excess flowed on Plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs assert that the pipeline was sized too small for 
the anticipated load from the Higley Wells. The trial court, however, conducted a site 
inspection in September 1997, and found that the pipe sufficed to accept and carry the entire 
flow from the Higley Wells. 
No evidence, in other words, suggests or demonstrates that Arthur Higley was 
responsible for any overflow. His sizing of the pipeline was supplementary to Mr. St. Clair's 
own careful, computer-assisted review, and was subject entirely to Mr. St. Clair's absolute 
veto. In any event, however, the pipeline was and is sufficient to carry all of the Higley Well 
water without difficulty. The trial court abused its discretion in holding Arthur Higley solely 
liable for any damages connected with the 1996-97 flooding. 
V. DEFENDANT ARTHUR HIGLEY DID NOT INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFS' PURPORTED 
EASEMENT NOR DID HE CONVERT PLAINTIFFS' WATER TO HIS OWN USE OR 
ALLOW IT TO RUN TO WASTE. 
For two months beginning in December of 1995, and again in July of 199,, Higley 
Well water was stored in the South Blue Lake. In August of that year, while Arthur Higley 
was vacationing with his wife in Yellowstone, Rulon released the stored water to irrigate 
Higley land. Arthur Higley did not instruct Rulon to release the water, nor did he know until 
his return that it had been released. 
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Russell Johnson claims that the water released was all his, and that it consisted of at 
least 100 acre feet. Actually, however Russell Johnson's water right entitles him to only 
.39cfs, which equates to approximately 24 acre-feet per month. Russell Johnson's claim that 
there were 100 acre-feet in the South Blue Lake which all belonged to him would require that 
the only source of the water be the sewer effluent from the Grantsville lagoons, that only 24 
acre-feet per month pass into the South Blue Lake, that four summer months pass without 
any evaporation whatsoever, and that Johnson had not used any of his allotment for the 
duration of those same four months. Needless to say, these premises border on the absurd. 
In essence, Plaintiffs assert, and the trial court agreed, that Defendant Arthur Higley 
is responsible for the release of water that wasn't Plaintiffs' because someone else released 
it without Arthur Higley's knowledge while he wasn't even in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the decision of the trial court be 
vacated, declaratory judgment be entered in favor of Defendants determining that Plaintiffs 
have no easement, either by grant or prescription, to store water on Defendants' land, and 
that the Defendants owe no damages to Plaintiffs for any flooding suffered. In the 
alternative, the Court should order the claims of Plaintiffs dismissed for failure to join 
indispensable parties. In the further alternative, the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this IS day of July, 1998, 
4ft5miK. Mangum (J ScottM. Ellsworth 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this day of July, 1998, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant were mailed by first class mail, U. S. Postage prepaid, addressed to 
Marc Wangsgard 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
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CONTRACT FOR DEED 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this ^rnj^ day of tpt-m^^ . 
1990, by and between FARM CREDIT BANK OF OMAHA hereinafter reierred to as 
SELLER, and ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY AND SUSAN M. HIGLEY, Husband and Wife, 
as Joint Tenants with full right to survivorship, hereinafter referred to 
as PURCHASER: 
WITNESSETH: 
That SELLER hereby agrees to sell to PURCHASER and PURCHASER 
hereby agrees to purchase and pay for the property described in Exhibit 
"A" and located in Tooele County, Utah: 
TOGETHER WITH all improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
including all water rights, including but not- limited to the following 
vater rights as evidenced by the State of Utah Water User's Claim numbers 
15-27S7,~15-328, 15-330, 15-1262, 15-1307, 15-331, and 15-411. 
7u u*lf >" -** '\ V •• * 3-i' 
SUBJECT TO property taxes and assessments for the year 1990 and 
subsequent years; to exceptions.and reservations contained in patents 
fro:r. the United States and the State of Utah; to all reservations, 
exceptions, zoning restrictions and covenants, if any, and ail 
easements and rights of vay actual or of record cr that may be apparent 
upon inspection of the surface. 
(Hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY) upon the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price for the PROPERTY is TWO 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/IOOTHS (£225,000.0&) vhich PURCHASER 
promises and agrees to pay to SELLER as follows: 
a. S16. 000.00 previously paid by PURCHASER, receipt of vhich is 
hereby acknowledged by SELLER; AND 
b. s51,500.0O paid by PURCHASER concurrently with the signing of 
this contract by SELLER and PURCHASER, receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged by SELLER; AND 
c. The remaining principal balance of S157,500.00 will be paid as 
follows: F0UR<4) annual principal payments in the amount of 
S7,e75.00 plus interest, vith the first annual principal and 
interest payment being due on the first of May, 1991, and a like 
sum due the first of May for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
THEN A FINAL BALLOON PAYMENT ON THE FIRST OF EK>OG*vfcrrr, 1995 IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $126,000.00 PLUS INTEREST. '>**<? J- 7" - #- . ~ ' . 
Interest on the.unpaid principal balance will accrue at the rate 
cf Ten CIO/1) percent. p&~ snnu^ i, and all interest payments viil 
be due on the first of May of ea^h year. Interest starting date 
for all unpaid principal shall begin on March 1, 1990. 
d. Said annual payments shall be applied first to the payment of 
all accrued interest then to the remaining unpaid principal 
balance as of the date of each such annual payment, and applied 
thereafter to the reduction of the principal balance due 
hereunder. 
MflfiK S/W 
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e. PURCHASER shall have the WJ^^ASgS^tP;/ prepay any amounts under 
this contract any time, •^^^enalty^vith such additional 
payments applied first to penalties and interest and then to 
reduce the unmatured principal balance oved hereunder. 
f. PURCHASER shall pay to SELLER a late payment penalty on all 
delinquent payments equal to Two percent (2.C%> per annum above 
the said contract interest rate and shall be conputed on the 
total past due amount from the date the payment vas due until 
the past due payment is made. Said late payment penalty shall 
be due at the time it is incurred and payable immediately. 
Failure to pay said penalty at the time it is incurred shall 
constitute a default hereof. 
2. POSSESSION. PURCHASER shall be entitled to enter into 
possession of the PROPERTY at closing and to continue in 
possession unless and until default is made under the terms 
hereof. 
3. DEED. Upon payment in full by PURCHASER of the purchase 
price and accrued interest as herein provided, SELLER agrees to convey 
the PROPERTY to PURCHASERS, by Deed or Deed vith Special Warranties. 
4. TITLE INSURANCE. Within 30 days of the execution of this 
agreement, SELLER vill furnish to PURCHASER e Title Insurance Policy 
in the amount of the purchase price. In the event PURCHASER'S finds 
defects in said title, SELLER, after written notice thereof, shall 
endeavor to have the same cured to the satisfaction of the PURCHASER, 
vithin a reasonable time. 
5. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. PURCHASER shall provide SELLER annual 
financial statements in a form acceptable to SELLER vhen requested by 
SELLER during the term of this Contract. 
6. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. Property taxes and assessments for the 
year 1989 and prior years shall be paid by SELLER. PURCHASER to 
pay all property taxes and assessments thereafter. If PURCHASER fails or 
refuses to pay any such taxes and assessments during the term hereof, 
SELLER may pay the same and the cost shall then be added to the purchase 
price and shall bear interest at the same rate, and Ehall be secured by 
the terms of this Contract. Provided further, PURCHASER'S failure to pay 
such taxes and assessments vhen due shall be deemed a default under this 
Contract. 
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7. ASSIGNMENT. PURCHASER shall not sell, assign or convey 
PURCHASER'S rights hereunder or to the PROPERTY without the prior 
written consent of SELLER, Such consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. 
S. ESCROW. The Federal Land Bank Association of the Midlands, in 
Casper, Wyoming, is hereby mutually nominated to act as Escrow Agent 
hereunder. SELLER covenants that SELLER will execute and deliver to the 
Agent a good and sufficient Deed or Deed with Special Warranties 
conveying said PROPERTY to PURCHASER, PURCHASER consents that PURCHASER 
will execute and deliver to Agent a Quitclaim Deed for the PROPERTY 
executed by PURCHASER in favor of SELLER. 
At such time as the PURCHASER shall have made all the payments due 
hereunder and shall have fully performed all other covenants on 
PURCHASER'S part to be made and performed, then and in such event, the 
Agent is authorized to deliver both DEEDS to PURCHASER. In the event of 
a default in the terms of this Contract by PURCHASER, then Agent shall 
file and record the Quitclaim Deed in favor of SELLER. All payments and 
billings will be handled directly between PURCHASER and SELLER. 
9. CONDITION OF PROPERTY. PURCHASER acknowledges that he has 
carefully examined the PROPERTY and they are purchasing the PROPERTY 
including any irrigation equipment in an *AS IS, WHERE IS" condition, 
with no implied or expressed warranty or warranties by SELLER or its 
agents. The execution of this Agreement by PURCHASERS will be deemed as 
acceptance of the PROPERTY in all respects. 
10. REPAIRS, MAINTENANCE OF IMPROVEMENTS, AND CARE OF PREMISES. 
PURCHASER shall keep the premises, including all farmground, in as good 
a condition as the same are now and shall make all repairs to any 
improvements required to maintain them in such condition. SELLER 
reserves the right of inspection of the premises at any reasonable time 
to insure compliance with this provision. 
11. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES. The parties agree that TIME IS OF THE 
ESSENCE of this Agreement, and the failure on the part of PURCHASER to 
keep and perform any of the conditions herein provided for or failure to 
make any payments hereunder within 30 days after the duty to perform such 
conditions arise, or after such payment or payments become due, shall 
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constitute a default. After said 30 day default period, PURCHASER shall 
have an additional ten (10) days, after vritten notice has been sent to 
them by SELLER notifying them of such default, vithin vhich to correct 
such default. In the event PURCHASER fails to correct the default vithin 
said ten (10) day period after vritten notice has been sent to 
PURCHASER, then such failure to correct the default shall vork in a 
forfeiture of this Agreement, and the SELLER shall have the right to take 
immediate possession of the PROPERTY and terminate all of the PURCHASER'S 
rights hereunder. SELLER shall have the right to possession of the 
escrowed documents and all payments made by PURCHASER hereunder shall be 
retained by SELLER as liquidated damages and rental for the use of the 
property. If SELLER so elects, SELLER shall have the right to institute 
legal proceedings to recover damages for the breach of the terms of this 
Contract for Deed and for all damages incurred as a result of the default 
by PURCHASER. The rights of the SELLER in enforcing SELLER'S rights 
hereunder are cumulative and are in addition to any and all other rights 
and remedies provided by lav. In any event, the SELLER shall be entitled 
to possession of the property and the rents and profits thereof from and 
after any such default, time being of the essence. 
In the event of litigation, the unsuccessful party agrees to pay all 
reasonable costs of the successful party, including but not limited to, 
attorney's fees. 
12. MECHANICS' L1EK AND SUPPLIERS' LIEKS. During the term of this 
Agreement, PURCHASER vill not knovingly allov any Mechanics' Liens or 
Suppliers' Liens to be placed on the PROPERTY. If any liens are placed 
on the PROPERTY, PURCHASER vill be deemed to be in default of this 
Contract if said liens are not removed in full, vithin five days of lien 
being filed. 
13. NOTICE: Notice required under this agreement shall be mailed 
to the folloving address, as notice to all PURCHASERS, by certified mail: 
TO BUYER: ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY 
SUSAN h. HIGLEY 
487 EAST 2400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
TO SELLER: FEDERAL LAND BANK ASSOCIATION OF THE MIDLANDS 
P.O. BOX 900, 
CASPER, WY 82602 
Ccs/J 
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Copies of any notices to SELLER shall be delivered concurrently to: 
FARM CREDIT BAKK OF OHAHA 
206 SOUTH 19TH STREET 
OMAHA, NE 68102 
The mailing of any such notice or demand to the SELLER or the PURCHASER 
at their respective addresses set forth above shall be deemed 
sufficient service thereof. If there is more than one SELLER or 
PURCHASER hereunder, the mailing of such notice shall be deemed to be 
sufficient service on ail such SELLERS and PURCHASERS respectively. 
Copies of all required notices shall be sent to the escrov agent. 
The ten (10) day period PURCHASER has under this Agreement to correct 
any written notice of default, shall begin upon receipt, by PURCHASER, 
of said written notice. In the event PURCHASER fails to collect and sign 
for said written notice, the notice shall be considered as having been 
received three (3> days following the deposit of the same in any United 
States Post Office by SELLER. Change of address for notice may be made 
by giving appropriate notice in vriting of such change to the other party 
and to the escrov agent. 
14. DIVISION OF EXPENSES FOR THIS TRANSACTION: The parties agree 
that the expenses in connection vith the sale and purchase of this real 
estate will be divided as follows: 
a. Attorney's fees, if any, for the drafting of this Agreement: 
SELLER 
b. Title insurance premium: SELLER 
c. Title corrections: SELLER 
d. Recording expenses: 
(I) Contract for Deed: Split 50/50 between SELLER and PURCHASER. 
e. Credit application fee: PURCHASER shall pay by separate check 
at time of closing, in the amount of 
$1,575.00. 
15. GOOD HUSBANDRY: PURCHASER will farm said premises through 
the term of this agreement in a manner consistent vith sound agricultural 
practice of the community in which the same are located and will not 
commit or suffer waste thereon, nor shall PURCHASER overgraze any of the 
pasture land contained in said premises. 
16. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This agreement contains the entire 
understanding of the parties. There are no representations, warranties, 
promises, covenants or undertakings other than thost' expressly set forth 
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herein. Mo modification or vaiver °* a^y of the terms of this Agreement 
shall be valid unless in vriting af*d executed with the same formality as 
this Agreement. Ko waiver of any t?rea^h hereunder shall be deemed a 
vaiver of any subsequent breach or default of the same or a similar 
nature. The failure of any party t o insist in any one or more instances 
upon the strict performance of any o £ *he terms or provisions of this 
Agreement on the part of the other party to be performed, shall not be 
construed as a waiver or relinquisnroen*t * o r the future of any such term 
or provision. The same shall cont*nue t n *ull force and effect. Ko 
vaiver or relinquishment shall be tfeemed to have been made by either 
party unless in writing, duly signed b v t h e party. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands to 
this Contract for Deed this 3™U ,. day of 772-*^.^A-^ , 1990. 
PURCHASER: 
O^^yjA^^ ^d\t^L^\ J^^J^_ 
ARTHUR STEPKEN^KIGLEY 
SELLER: 
FARM CREDIT BANK OF 0«AHA 
by Fedeisl Land Bz 
of^tfyomlngy its a 
Ln-fact. 
SUSAN H. HIGLEY RON &. YOUNG ~ 
Assistant Vice 
STATE OF } lAM 
COUNTY O-JUSAJ^— 
) 8E. 
The foregoing instrument vas acknovfedaed/'Before me by ARTHUR STEPHEN 
2— dafr A£ 'y>UuJ, , 1990. Witness by HIGLEY AND SUSAN M. HIGLEY, this 
hand and official seal. 
Notary Public 
\f/jL^l 
My commission expires:^ 
STATE OF WYOMING ) 
) 6 8 . 
COUNTY O F NATRONA > 
ijj^jm. NOTARY PUBLIC PETER K. ELLISON 
One South Main Street 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
December 19.19S2 
_g*ATgOFUTAH 
On this (,& day of y?)/iAsA^ _, 1990, before me, a Notary Public, 
personally appeared Ron L. Young, t o m* k n o v n l 0 b* the person named 
herein and vho executed the foregoing instrument, and vho did svear that 
he is Assistant Vice President of the above named Federal Land Bank 
Association; that the instrument « a s signed on behalf of the Corporation 
by authority of the Board of Directors; and acknowledged the execution of 
the instrument to be the voluntary act and deed of the corporation and of 
gr.t^a^vdg^^to^aop^e^ecAited by the corporation and the agent voluntarily. 
I ELLEN M. SARVER . Norary Public" { s&a / Vu , /jA , • 
C o ^ Of ^ S:3,e Of N S*4i£l(^- M^/UJ 
\ N«ron. ( g $ * W n B *****r P u b X l c 
y Mycowmiare^ionFv-e»x^ifcjeg: 
( 6 ) 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
TOWNSHIP 2^ SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AMD MERIDIAN 
SECTIOH 8: E1/2SEI/4 
SECTION 9: SW1/4, lees railroad right-of-way 
SECTION 16: Wi/2, NV/1/4HE1/4, less 4.96 acres or railroad 
right-of-vay 
SECTION 17: N1/2KE1/4 
SECTION 20: SW1/4SW1/4, W1/2SE1/4, El/2SV?l/4» W2/3W1/2NE1/4, 
E1/2SE1/4 
SECTION 21: Wl/2 
SECTION 26: The eastern 1023 feet of the HE1/4NW1/4. 
Beginning at the NW corner of Section 26, 
thence east along section line 1717.7 feet to 
Grantsville City line? thence south along said 
city line 1320 feet to south line of NE1/4NV1/4; 
thence vest 1717.7 feet to section line? thence 
north along section 1320 feet, to the point of 
beginning, containing 52.05 acres, more or less. 
SECTION 29: NE1/4, E1/2HE1/4NW1/4 
STATE 0* I T ^ )
 <<t 
COUNTY CF TOOELE ) SS 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY Of 
THE DOCUMENT THAT APPEARS OF RECORD IN 
MY OFFICE. 
otfi WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL ^ 
THISX-DAY OF -^Gfltr.niher \%dJ 
DONNA S. McKENDRICK 
JWELECOUNTYRECOROER 
BY 7¥k/l//rf7S 1/!/777k?S? DEPUTY 
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C.E. Henderson 
D i s t r i c t J u d g e 
Dated t h i s 1 1 t h day o f F e b r u a r y , 1946 . 
By t h e C o u r t . 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) s s . 
County o f T o o e l e . ) . 
I , David S a n k h e a d , C l e r k o f t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e S t a t e of Utah,- i n and 
f o r T o o e l e County , do h e r e b y C e r t i f y t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i s a f u l l , t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e 
O r i g i n a l O r d e r C o n f i r m i n g S a l e o f Rea l P r o p e r t y , i n t h e n a t t e r o f t h e e s t a t e o f G e o r g e ' s . Reming-
ton and D a i l y E. Reming ton , h i s w i f e , d e c e a s e d , 
a s a p p e a r X s of r e c o r d and on f i l e i n my o f f i c e . 
V/ITNESS t h e C l e r k o f s a i d C o u r t , w i t h t h e s e a l t h e r e o f a f f i l e d , t h i s 7 t h day o f ^ a r c h , 
A.D. 1 9 4 6 . 
David Bankhead / s / 
(SEAL) C l e r k . 
#220950 
Recorded a t t h e r e q u e s t of U. E a r l M a r s h a l l , i l a r c h 7 - 1 9 4 6 , a t 3 :35 P.II . 
EPH COUNTY RECORDER 
-EA5EJEMT-
? El IN A '#. ANDERSON, GRANTOR, o f NORTH UOLLYvVOOD, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, h e r e b y 
G i v e s , g r a n t s and t r a n s f e r s to PAUL E. V/RATHALL,4 h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , GRANTEE, 
o f G r a n t s v i l l e , T o o e l e Coun ty , U t a h , f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e sua of $ 1 . 0 0 , and o t h e r good 
and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , have g r a n t e d , b a r g a i n e d , t r a n s f i x e d nnd d e l i v e r e d and by t h e s e p r e s e n 
do g r a n t , b a r g a i n , t r a n s f e r and d e l i v e r u n t o PAUL E. V/RATHALL, h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and 
a s s i g n s , an u n c o n d i t i o n a l easement and r i g h t i n and to t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d r e a l p r o p e r t y i n 
T o o e l e Coun ty , S t a t e o f U t a h , to w i t : 
The Nor thv /es t q u a r t e r o f t h e S o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r and 
t h e n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r o f s o u t h w e s t q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 
20 , Township 2 S o u t h , Range 5 West , S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n , 
c o n t a i n i n g 30 a c r e s more o r l e s s ; 
f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f s t o r i n g w a t e r t h e r e u p o n , g i v i n g and g r a n t i n g u n t o t he s a i d PAUL E. WRATH ALL, 
h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l e a semen t and u s e o f so jiuch of s a i d 
a b o v e d e s c r i b e d l a n d as w i l l be c o v e r e d and o c c u p i e d by t h e s t o r a g e of w a t e r t h e r e u p o n , s u f f i c i e n 
to c o n t a i n w a t e r s run t h e r e u p o n i n t h e n a t u r a l c o u r s e t h e r e o f , i n s t o r i n g s a i d w a t e r , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h t h e ri.c;ht o f i n g r e s s and e g r e s s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e f u l l and c o m p l e t e u s e , o c c u p a t i o n and 
en joyment o f t h e e a s e m e n t h e r e b y g r a n t e d and a l l r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s i n c i d e n t t h e r e t o i n c l u d i n g 
t h e r i g h t to b u i l d , r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n s a i d s t o r a g e r e s e r v o i r o r o t h e r u s e of s a i d w a t e r . 
T h i s e a s e u o n t s h a l l be i n f o r c e and e f f e c t p e r p e t u a l l y . 
D?ited t h i s 1 s t day of i Ja rch , 1 9 4 6 . 
S i g n e d in n r e s o n c e o f : P e n i n a \7. Anderson / s/ 
3 T A T E 0 r 0 .-\L 1 .0 RN IA 
Co M :: t y o f '^ 0 5 An z c-1 e s 
On t h e 1 s t day of March, A.D. 1 9 4 6 , p e r s o n a l l y appea red b e f o r e me, P e n i n a V/. Anderson, t h e 
s i g n e r of t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t who d u l y acknowledged to me t h a t she e x e c u t e d the same. 
( N o t a r i a l S e a l ) G e r a l d i n e E. Pugh / s / 
.ay commiss ion e : c p i r e s : NOTARY PUBLIC 
iiy commiss ion e x p i r e s Mar. 28, 1 9 4 9 . N o t a r y P u b l i c 
I n and fo r t h e County of Los Ange l e s , S t a t e . 
#220944 of C a l i f o r n i a 
R e c o r d e d a t t h e r e q u e s t o f P a u l E. " r a t h a l l , Mar. 6 - 1 9 4 6 , a t 2 :30 P.M. 
EP* COUNTY RECORDER 
STATeOPlT^ |ss 
MY OFFICE. 
TH.si-DAV £ ^ j g £ £ S & 
~^. ,».TV QcrnRnPR 
EASEiENT 
J . KEITh BROl/N and ELBA H. BRO\/N, h i s v / i f e , GRANTORS o f G r a n t s v i l l e , T o o e l e County , S t a t e 
of U t a n , h e r e b y g i v e , g r a n t and t r a n s f e r to PAUL E. WRATriALL, h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , 
CPANTEE, of t n e s a i e p l ^ c e , f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e sum of £ 1 . 0 0 , and o t h e r good and 
v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h a v e g r a n t e d , b a r g a i n e d , t r a n s f e r r e d and d e l i v e r e d and by t h e s e p r e s e n t s 
do g r a n t , b a r g a i n , t r a n s f e r and d e l i v e r u n t o PAUL E. V.'RATnALL, h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and 
a s s i g n s , an u n c o n d i t i o n a l easemen t and r i g h t i n and to t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d r e a l p r o p e r t y i n 
T o o e l e ^ o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h , to w i t : 
The N o r t h w e s t q u a r t e r of t h e N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r and 
t h e N o r t h h a l f of t h e N o r t h w e s t w a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 
29 , Township 2 S o u t h , Range 5 West of t h e S a l t Lake 
M e r i d i a n , and t h e S o u t h w e s t Q u a r t e r o f S o u t h e a s t 
Q u a r t e r and S o u t h e a s t Q u a r t e r o f Sout . iwes t Q u a r t e r 
of S e c t i o n 20 , Township 2 S o u t h , Range 5 Wes t , S a l t 
L i k e M e r i d i a n , c o n t a i n i n g 160 a c r e s more o r l e s s , o r 
so much t h e r e o f a s s h a l l be n e c e s s a r y and c o n v e n i e n t 
f o r t h e u s e h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h , b u t s h a l l n o t exceed 
t h e n a t u r a l r e s e r v i o r b a s i n . 
Fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f s t o r i n g w a t e r t h e r e u p o n , g i v i n g and g r a n t i n g u n t o t h e s a i d PAUL E. WRATHALL, 
h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l e a s e m e n t and u s e o f so much o f s a i d 
aDove d e s c r i b e d l a n d a s w i l l b e c o v e r e d and o c c u p i e d by t n e s t o r a g e o f w a t e r t h e r e i n and t n e r e o n , 
s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n t a i n w a t e r s run t h e r e u p o n t h e t h e n a t u r a l c o u r s e t h e r e o f , i n s t o r i n g s a i d w a t e r , 
t o g e t h e r w i t h t n e r i g h t o f i n g r e s s and e g r e s s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e ' f u l l and c o m p l e t e u s e , o c c u p a t i o n 
and en joymen t o f t h e e a s e m e n t h e r e b y g r a n t e d and a l l r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s i n c i d e n t t h e r e t o i n c l u d -
i n g t h e r i r n t to b u i l d , r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n s a i d s t o r a g e r e s e r v i o r o r o t h e r u s e o f s a i d w a t e r . 
T h i s easement s n a i l be i n f o r c e and e f f e c t p e r p e t u a l l y . 
Dated t h i s 15 day o f J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 6 . 
ATTEST: J . K e i t h Brown / s / 
E l b a K. Brown / s / 
ST'iTE Of UTAH ) 
) s s . 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
On t h e 1 5 t h day o f J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 6 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me, J . K e i t h s rown and E l b a 
K. Brown, h i s " i f e , t h e s i g n e r s o f t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t who d u l y acknowledged to me t h a t t . i ey 
e x e c u t e d t h e same. 
iiv commiss ion e : : o i r e s : 
J u l y 5, 1946 
( N o t a r i a l S e a l ) 
J . A l l e n P a r k i n s o n /s/ 
N o t a r y P u b l i c , r e s i d i n g a t 
G r a n t s v i l l e , Utah 
/ T ' 2 2 0 9 4 5 
Recorded a t t h e r e q u e s t o f P a u l E. V . ' r a tha l l , d a r . 6 - 1 9 4 6 , a t 2 : 3 1 P.M. 
EPU COUNTY RECORDER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
J U ; 5 COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I n tu - Ll^ttc1* o- t h e E s t a t e o i 
IRVTi hlLLU^N, D e c e a s e d . 
DECREE ALLO'./INC FIRST AND FINAL 
ACCOUNT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE AND DIS-
CHARGING THE ADMINISTRATRIX AMD 
I E ^ L A S I . J G 4J f .-ONDSUIJ. 
Now comes E l l e n 0 . F r e d e r i c k s o n , f o r m e r l y i - l l e n 0 . H i l l m a n , a d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f t h e e s t a t e o f 
t h e above named d e c e d e n t , by h e r a t t o r n e y C.N. L e a t h e r b u r y , and p r o v e s to t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f 
t h e c o u r t t h a t h e r p e t i t i o n f o r t h e a l l o w a n c e o f t h e f i r s t and f i n a l a c c o u n t o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t -
r i x and f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e r e s i d u e o f t h e e s t a t e and t h e r e l e a s e o f h e r bondsmen was 
f i l e d on t h e 2nd day o f F e b r u a r y , 1946 , and t h a t t h e c l e r k o f t h i s c o u r t , on F e b r u a r y 5, 1 9 4 6 , 
a p p o i n t e d t h e 1 8 t h day o f F e b r u a r y , 1946 f o r t h e n e a r i n g t n e r e o f and t h a t due and l e g a l n o t i c e 
of" t h e t ime and p l a c e o f h e a r i n g was g i v e n a s r e q u i r e d by l a w and by an o r d e r o f t h i s c o u r t ; and 
s a i d p e t i t i o n b e i n g now p r e s e n t e d to t h i s c o u r t , and no p e r s o n a p p e a r i n g t o c o n t e s t o r o b j e c t t o 
t h e s a n e , t h e c o u r t a f t e r h e a r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e , b e i n g s a t i s f i e d t h a t a l l d e b t s l i s t e d a g a i n s t 
t h e s a i d e s t a t e a r e t r u e and c o r r e c t , and t h e same a r e h e r e b y a l l o w e d and a p p r o v e d , and r e c e i p t s 
f o r t h e same h a v i n g been f i l e d h e r e i n , and t h a t a l l t a x e s upon t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e s a i d e s t a t e 
h a v e been p a i d , t h a t n o t i c e to c r e d i t o r s was d u l y p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Times News of N e p h i , U t a h , 
and a d e c r e e of due and l e g a l n o t i c e to c r e d i t o r s h a s been s i g n e d and f i l e d h e r e i n , and t h a t 
t h e t i n e f o r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f n o t i c e to c r e d i t o r s h a s e x p i r e d , and t h a t t h e f u n e r a l e x p e n s e s 
and e x p e n s e s o f t h e l a s t i l l n e s s o f t h e d e c e a s e d h a v e been p a i d i n f u l l and t h a t a l l m a t t e r s 
a p p e a r i n g upon t h e r e c o r d s h e r e i n a r e t r u e , and a r e h e r e b y a p p r o v e d and found c o r r e c t , and t h a t 
s a i d e s t a t e i £ now i n a c o n d i t i o n to be c l o s e d . 
STATE OP iTW ) ss 
i t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t saQ&jtW&fc&F&OE&lrix i s c h a r g e a b l e 
to Wi t : ,
 H e R 6 B Y CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF 
THE DOCUMENT THAT APPEARS OF RECORD IN 
MY OFFICE 
And i t b e i n g shov.n to t h e 
w i t h e s t a t e a s s e t s a s f o l l o w s , 
THISX-DAY OF 
DONNA S McKENORlCK 
Tab 3 
I 
A 0 R £ K M B » !T 
THIS AGREEMEIT mada and antared Into at Orantarilla, Tooala 
County, 8tata of Utah, on tha / ^ ^ d t y of May, 1946, by and batwaan 
PAUL E. WRATHALL and CARRIE WAATHALL, hi§ wifa, of Orantrrilla aforeaaid, 
Firat Partial, and MAXWELL A. J0HI80I of Orantarilla aforaaaid, Saaond 
Party, 
WHEESA8 tha partiaa harato ara tha ownara of tha right to tha usa 
of a portion of tha watara of Fiahlng Craak in Tooala County, ttata of Utah, 
and hara panding in tha Offioa of tha Stata Bnglnaar of tha Stata of Utah 
applioatlona to atora a portion of tha wintar watar of aaid w)c in tha 
raaarrolr harainaftar vtwr^d to and to uaa tha watar that atorad at a 
latar tin* upon thair raapaotira nearby landai and 
WHEREAS Firat Partiaa hara upon tha following landt, to wits 
tha wfr of tha SSfc, tha •} of tha Stfc and tha fl£ of tha fltt of taction 10, 
tha iwi of tha Ili and tha H of tha lt$ of Saatlon 19, Twp. t South, 
tango 6 Haat# Salt Laka Bata and Vtittlan, an aaaaitant antitling than to 
araot, aonatroat and Maintain upon aaid land r9Bwroir& or dltahaa and hara 
haratofora oonatruatad upon aaid land haralnbafora daaorlbad a dika or dam 
in tuoh aumtr aa to form upon aaid pranitat a raaarroiri and 
WHEREAS it ia tha datlra of Saoond Party to aoquirt from Firat Partiaa 
an aqual intaraat with than in aaid aaaamant and aaid raaarrolr and tha right 
to atora watar in aaid raaarroiri 
MOW THEREFORE, IT 18 HEREBY A0KESD BETWBBR tha partiaa harato aa 
followai 
1» That tha Firat Partiaa do haraby gira and grant unto tha Saaond 
Party, hla haira, tuooaaaora and aaalgnt, an undlrldad ona-half intaraat in 
tha aaaamant upon aaid pramlaas* togathar with an undlrldad ooa-haLT lnteraat 
in and to aaid dika or dam, and an undiridad ooa-half intaraat in tha right 
and pririlaga of atorlng watar in tha raaortolr araatad by at id dam, to tha 
end t)iat the Firut Parties and Second Party shall be entitled to the 
benefit, use and enjoyment of it id easement and reaerroir in all reapeota 
ahare and share alike* 
2. The Second Party agreee to pay Firat Partiea for tha one-half 
lntaraat hereby eesigned the sua of OWE TH0U8WD 1W0 HUIDRID AID FORTY 
DOLLAR8 (11,240.00), payable aa follows! Six hundred and twenty dollara 
($620*00) payable in oaeh on or before sixty (60) days from tha data of 
this Agreement and tha balanoe of 8ix hundred and twenty dollara (#620.00) 
on or before 2 year a from tha data hereof, tha unpaid balanoe to baar 
lntaraat at tha rata of 4 & par annum* and firat Partiea ahall have and are 
hereby given a vendor'a llan upon aald eaecnent, raaarroir and intereata 
hereby a a signed to —pwrm tha payment of aaid unpaid pureL»»? *riae and 
in tha arent of foreoloeure of aald llan and a dofUionoy Saaond Party 
agreee to pay auah dafiolanoy and Saaond Party agreee to pay aliooata, 
imolading Attorney*a fooc, in tha forealoaure of aald llan or tha collection 
of aaid amount aftar ita maturity^ 
* • XT IS tniMHUTOOO between tha partias hereto that tha dike or 
dam above rafarrad to oroaaaa tha Ilfc of tha Stfc of taatlon 10, Tap, and 
langa aforesaid, la auoh manner at *o ancloee in aald raaarroir approximately 
one aara of land in aaid ffJ& of tha Sffc of Saotion 20 and that tha Firat 
Partiea, although in poeeeeeion of aald W»i of tha S*i of Saotion 20 do not 
hare an aaaaaant for tha oonetraetlon and aaintananaa of aaid dike and tha 
ineluelon of aald aara of ground, mora or lea a, within aald raaarroir, and 
it la agreed bataaan tha partiea hereto that by purchaaing an undivided 
one-half lntaraat in aald dike and aaaamaata and raaarroir tha Saaond Party 
ahall not be and become liabla for damage to tha Wf£ of tha 8*£ of Saotion 20 
and tha First Parties agree that thay will forthwith uaa their beat effort a 
to aoqulre tha propar right or aaaaaant for tha oontinuad maintenance of 
aaid dike In ita praaent location and that thay will pay auoh reasonable 
amount aa may be neeeeeary to acquire that right and tha right to tha uaa 
of approximately tha one aara of ground encloaed In aaid reaerroir, and that 
*« b^twoen the parties hereto the Firat Parttet will tare the 8eoond Party 
hermleae on aooount of the oririnal conatruotion of aaid dike and the 
including of approximately one tore of ground in eaid reeerroir, And it 
ia further agreed between the partiea hereto that in the erent Firat Partiea 
oannot aoquire the right to oontinue the aaid dike and reeerroir in ite 
preaent looation orer the aaid N*} of the SWj of aaid Seotion 20, they will 
realign eaid dike or dam ao that the a a me ia entirely upon land embraoed 
within the eaeement of the Firat Partiee. 
4« IT 18 AORSKD between the partiea hereto that from and after 
the date hereof they will pay ehare and ehare alike all ooete of meintenanoe 
and improvement of teid reeerroir or any enlargement thereof* 
6* It ie oomtemplated between the partite hereto that they will 
eaoh etore equal emounte of water In aaid reeerroir and that they ehall 
eaoh be entitled aquelly to withdraw from eaid reeerroir at auoh time* ae 
they nay eererally aleot the water to whioh they are entitled, but if for 
any reeeon either party hereto ahould fail to divert Imto and itore in 
eeid reeerroir ae puoh water aa the other party m y divwrt and atore In 
eaid reeerroir, then the amount of water etored la eaid reeerroir thall be 
dlrided In proportion to the reepeotive amounte the partiee hereto hare 
reapeotirely diverted and plaeed in eaid reeerroir. 
6. It ie underetood between the partiea hereto that the eaeementa 
whioh Firet Partiee hare inolude more land than ie ooverei by the preeent 
dlk* and reeerroir and that t^ie Aealgnaent oovere only the eaeement in the 
landa upon whioh aaid dike and reeerroir are looated, and partieularly that 
Firyt Partiea r^mrre the aree within the lande held by eaeement north of 
aaid reeerroir for the purpoae of oonetruoting and maintaining north of aaid 
rieervolr an irrigation ditoh or dltohee. 
n WIT9CS8 WHSKK0F the partiee hereto hare hereunto eubeeribed their 
n**m§ the day and year firet above written* 
3TATI OF UTAH ) 
) SB 
OOOTTY OF T00EL8 ) 
On tha / y day of Ifcy, 1946, paraoaally appaarad bafora ma 
PAUL I. URATEALL and CARBZI WRATIALL, bis wif## and K4XWBLL A. J0HX8Q*, 
aifnara of tha foragoing laatrtu*ttt# who duly aokaowladgad to w that 
thay axaoutad tha aa»a. 
My Comiaaion axpiraa, 
H««idia« la 
* fft*h. 
IV, '0 ."1; 
\1 ' •" "^~~.> \ 
^ ^ 
*'^ v^ -/ 
Tab 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—-00O00—— 
J . J . CASTAQNO and EDITH CASTAONO, h i s 
w i f e , CHARLES H. TTDRTKINQTON and ANNIE 
B. WORTRTHOTON, h i s w i f e , ' SAMUEL H. 
WORTHTNOTON and LIBBI B . WCETHINOTON, 
h i s w i f e , IRENE W. PAGE, MADELL A . 
JOHNSON and ERKA JOHNSON, tala w i f e , 
Plaintiffs, 
PAUL E. !RAIHALL,*nd 
his wife, BOTH 
hie wife, 
QUUSH 
and BLANi 
BROWgand 
LAfBENOE 
wife, 
JOHEBCfj 
Al*x Jehnaoa^ 
ABDERSON, 
iDifeadants'. 
F1KDIBQS OF FACT AKD 
SXXW05LC&S OF Ugr 
court, vlth the Honorable J* eUlan. Crockett,l#»dge .thereof presiding, on the 5th 
day of April, 1950, the plaintiff a and dafeadante hating appeared by aad through 
their respective attorneya, and the court having heard the eridenoe adduced, 
nor enters its Findings of Feet and Cenclueions of Lars 
FIHDIHOS OF FACT 
1. That the defendanta Mile 0. Higley and Blanche Higley, hie wife, 
by and throng their attorney of record, E» LeRoy Shielda, stipulated at the 
eewaeneeaent of the trial that their rights vera Junior and inferior to the 
rights of all the other plaintiffs and defendants aad that they would be en* 
titled to no water unless there waa water eurplua to the rights of the other 
plaintiffe and defendants* 
Z. That all of the plaintiff a and defandante, Paul X* trathall and 
Carrie trathall, his wife, Keith Brtra and lira Brown, hia wife^ frdnten iron 
"Come now the parties through their respective attorneys of 
record and stipulate as follows: 
"1* That J. J. Castagno and Edith Castagno, his wife, ere 
the oimers of and are in possession of the following des-
cribed lands in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
The northwest quarter of 8ection 21, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West, S.L.B. & M., containing 160 
acres. 
"2. That Charles H« Worthington and Samuel H. Worthington 
are co-partners and ara tha owners of and are in poaaeaaion 
of the following daaoribad lands In Tooele County, State of 
Utaht 
The East § of the Southeaet quarter of Section 8; 
the Souttweet quarter of Section 9} the Xortlvaat 
quarter, of the Jjharthsaat quarter and thi weet half 
i f flection 16, ^ p s Hor^Ktlf V the Hortheast 
5 Wset, Salt^L^^Baee; and Meridian, containing 
approximatel^6&0 acrea. 
•3. Ihat bane % Pagejfr-thi 
cribed land In Tooele County, 
of.the following dee-
of TJtaht 
Beginning at a point 98 feeV.Bast fro» Southveat 
thence 
acres* 
"Ihat eaid laada »f Irene Y# Page were leaaed to J. J* Castag-
no and Edith Castagno, hia wife, on April 21, 19U8, for a 
tern of 5 years, and the aaid Castagnos wt% in possession 
thereof* 
BU. That Maxwell k. Johnson ia the owner of n d is in the 
poaaeaaion of the following described land in Tooele County, 
State of Utah: 
The North half of tha Hortisrest quarter of Section 
20, in Townahip 2 South, Range 5 West of the Salt 
Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. Also the South 
half, the South half of the Hortheast quarter, and 
the Southeast quarter of the Hor threat quarter of 
Section 17, in Townahip 2 South of Bange $ West of 
tha Salt lake Meridian, containing U80 acres. 
"5# That Paul trathall ia tha owner and ia in poaaeaaion 
of the following daaoribad laada in Tooele County, State of 
Utah: 
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Thi Northeast quarter and the South half of -
Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 2 
South! Ranee 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Ner1 
containing 21*0 acres. 
"6* That Penina W* Anderson is the owner of the following 
described lands leoated in Tooele County, Statu of totalis 
The Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and 
the Kortteeet quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 20, Township 2 South, Bangs 5 lest, 8. L* 
B* 4 M. | containing 80 aires* 
•7* Thit toith Brown andiMj 
sad J s ^ ^ A ^ ^ ^ t a i ^ p i a r i 
the lands dsscribedin'r-
answer end oemtorelaia* 
•JB. That oolyiwte^Dl 
is as fellowet 
^^ -^j-iSjulnten Brown 
?«re in possession of 
" thedefendants' 
of the parties 
.usive, of this 
age of the lands 
eaoh of the parties 
•(a) ,MciMmm^^m^^mmt^m 
(b) rI^ |^ i^!iMS|5Si^ »Jt^ » ^ ww^ r***™?^ ^™ - • .-• • • 102*0 (o) i t o l f c a t h ^ • • . . . . * . . - . . . . - - 125.7$ (d) Penina ¥• Anderson • • • • • 29*50 (e) Maxwell MBMuit duu^^di^ij^A^ii^iyi 192.5 (f) ttithrBrown^^ 
and Jack Brown • ; . * * * * . . 76*00 
(g) Samel H« and Charles H* Worthington 
«W» Irrigation* « , 
Salt Qrassunder 
Irrigation * -*..-
Ditches tost only occas-
ionally irrigated 
"That in addition to the above the defendants Brown olain 
the right* ae is set forth in paragraph 36 of their iiiewei 
and counterclaiM to use water on tte Kortfavest half of tte 
Hartteast quarter ml tte lortheast qmsrter of tte Hortteeet 
quarter of Section 29 at sooh tines as tte otter parties are 
harvesting their hayj that plaintiffs deny this claimed 
right} but i t i s agreed that this stipulation on irrigated 
acreage is without jnrejxw^ Browns.* 
/Rertles did not agree to paragraph 9 of tte stipulation as 
filed^ 
•10* « » ^ i * ^ ^ 
to&nm^ on or about tte 1st 
day of March of each year and extend* to tte let day of Bor-
enter of eaoh year * 
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"11* That the agreement which is attached to the answer 
and counterclaim of defendants Brown and Wrathall, and vhich 
is mar ted Exhibit B, (said agreement covering the right to 
use water during the winter tims from November 1st to Uarch 
1st) is an executed agreement and should be adopted by the 
court in Its decree as fixing the rights to use the waters 
of Three Kile or Fishing Greek during the period from Nov-
ember 1st to the following March 1st of each year. 
•12 • Siat on March 28th, the water table underlying the 
lands described in paragraphs 1 to 7f inclusive, was tested 
at HUMMUS points, and that on the high knolls the ground 
water was aV^p place more than 2 feet from the surface; 
that in thafiwilas the water table or ground water was at 
eurfeoe levil. 
•13. B a t ; r « p worked Exhibit «A"f showing the lands 
Sdp/Sdl 
» & But 
intheplai 
deseribod 
It say bo 
s correctly portrays land owner-
admitted in evidence* 
^^•rltl.pbotogriph'of tht'l«nd8 described 
oorr»otly portryg tba^a>M.dmy*hj^he 
itonraap abowlnjt the alepe of^tbe lands 
IMrrtet oontoar nip of thtcarea, that 
' *,t »D» and admitted in eridence. 
•17* that defendant Mil* 0. Hijley tOaA Application 17839 
en or about Maroh 15, 191*6, in tht office of th» State Sn-
flnter, and la now tat owner tbaroof• 
•18. that dtfeadaftt Paul 1. Vratnall filed Application Ho. 
17062 In tht ef fiat of tht State toginetr on or about tha 20th 
day of UmN&$$3M$$ and that aald defendant ia the owner 
theraaf. aift^tj^ititnr, to^htJroriaSon of the agree-
ment which ial^kwd ftdiibit »B«jahd ia^mttachi' __ . ^JtoiiSjttaoha4.'to the fit defend^ trathall. 
<U,i fehnaon filed Applicatioft Ho. 1705° 
v'the StetTlnxineer cTo7aboui tha 19th 
Bomvwwr, w'^ ww?|rvnMHM JadfljBibli "BVrtdeh ia attached 
to tha oowterolAln of ^ afattdant wrathall. 
"20* That Charlaii B* lorthlagton and Saanal B. Worthiaf-
ton, Morrla I . *»athall^ Iraoe Face, and Robert Lawrence 
filed Appllnatlnn 18359 In tha office of tha State Engineer, 
and that J. J. Caatagno and Bdith Gaatapo, Ida wife, 
soeoeedad to tte interett of Morrla I . trathall thtrainj 
that aald partita and 4, J* Caatafno and Idlth Caatafno 
are tht evaer* thereof, wafeject, however, to tha provision* 
of Exhibit nf, Trt&cb U attached to tht anaaxar and coanUr-
elaln of defendant wrathall. 
MDated ^uo 1st 
« Edward t.. Clyde 
Attorney for Plaintiffs ™ " 
- Eliae Hansen _ 
Attorney for defendants Paul E. 
ftrathall, Carrie ftrathall, Keith 
Brown, Elra Brown, Quinten Brown, 
Jack Brown, Dona Brown and Penina 
IT. Anderson" 
That the facts recited 'in said"Stipul" *» i ,Tih above, art: found by • 
the court to be true* 
** M agreed ty all of the parties that there \*» u» ?TJ 
in the acreage ehown to Penina IT, Anderson and Pa\^ Wraths i 11 1.1.1 ii 
s t i p u l a f e t o n ^ i i o ^ .'of irrigated ground 
and Paul E. WrathaU to h a v e l i n ^ Penina W. Ander 
son's g r o u n d ! ^ £• Wrathall's 
ground whic^ M r i ^ be so amended* 
been two natural ^prlxif^ 
^3fiToiTOlP^f9«^t8 Utahf that the 
waters issuing from said two springs flow in a northwesterly direction and c 
minglf pur in section line which is common to Section 33 and 28. > 
2 South, Range 5 lest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian * * *- .^-a . 
stream and channel which is known ae Fiahinf ^~»*
 t only wate 
tributed from natural sources * a contributed by the two springy 
described abov,' m 1 unnamed sj** aige along the cnarme*; t u ; 
Fishl'ip « ' ' flyiiiacti stream with a mora mm less constant flow* 
$• That all of the lands described » upuxation as b e L ^ 
owned by the plaintiffs awl defendant ,,, 1
 Mru uliftiui,y alkaline; that 
unless the lands ar« * alkaline
 :salts are 4*ehed from the lands, 
t km «'( IIPIF . valuable for the raising*of crops; tt*t : 
to the lands to wash the alkaline salts from them durl 
wall'as during the other seasons; that ,
 s \mt ,,.s. 
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tha plaintiff a and dafandantaHrathall, Brora* and Anderson and ihair pradaoaasor 
owners of tba tracts of land described in the stipulation above hare diverted 
watar from Thraa Hila or Fishing Craak and haya appliad tba saw to tha irriga-
tion of tbalr respective lands; that all of tba waters of Fishing Craak have 
been used by the plaintiff a and said defendants; that aaid use has bean bene-
ficial to tha growing of crops) that i t i s beneficial to tha growing of crops 
to divert and use watar aa early aa March 1st and to continue the use of the 
ssae until October 31st of aaoh year* and for aare than sixty fire years last 
paat tha aaid parties hate *o used the watar) that beginning in approj±aately 
1930 tha plaintiff a or thsir jaredeoees^a ^ the defendants Brora, 
'*** 
Wirathall and Anderson, or^theJr 
** 
»v* t
 v 1 
in intereet, antared Into aa oral 
j&& 
oontraot to govern the i » ,of ^  assanca of aaid oral contract 
waa reduced to writing, but tha wilting 
or their predaoaaaorai 
provided aa followat 
arrar aifnad by any of tha parties 
aa manif airtad by aaid writing, 
JAMES 
_ ^wuainjM^/partiaa of the first 
P^^l A X B Weaam^M PfflftlS JOBBSOW, parties of tba 
eeond part) WCBIHIHOT0H BpOTHKES, partiaa of tha third 
partj and WILLIAM L. BOOTH, party of tba fourth part, 
all of QrantaviUa, Tooele County, state of Utah, WIT-
NESSETH: 
"THAT WHEREAS the partiaa of tha first part are tha owners 
of certain real property deecribed aa follows: 
The Northwest quarter of flection 21, with tha 
exception of 9k0 ffcet on tha South aide of 
aaid Quarter Section) tha East one-half of 
Section 20) tha South one-half of tha Xorth-
west Quarter of Section 20, and tha Southwest 
Quarter of Section 20, all in Township 2 South, 
Range 5 West/ Salt Lake Baas and Meridian. 
"AMD WHEREAS tha partiaa of tha second part are the owners 
of certain real property described aa follows, to wit: 
All of Section 17, and the Xerttoeet Quarter 
of the Borttsreet Quarter of Section 20, both 
in Toanahip 2 South, Bangs £ Weat, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian* 
•AMD 1HBREAS ti» partiaa of the third part are the owners 
of certain real property described aa follewa, to wit: 
The Weet one-half of Seotlon 16j the Northwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 16; 
The Southwest Quarter of Section 9; the East 
Quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 8; 
and the North one-half of the Northeast Quarter 
of Section 17, al l in Township 2 South, Range 
5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ., 
* AND WHEREAS the party of the fourth part owns an inter-
est in the real property described as follows, to-wit: 
The East one-half of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 20j the Northeast Quarter of the South-
west Quarter of 
Quarter of the 
the Southwest 
oast Quarter of 
ion 29; also, ci 
of thi Northeast 
20.73 chains, North1 
South 20 chains to ^ 
2 acres for road, 
property being in 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian> 
•AND WHEREAS al l «f the 
owners in a 
stress being 
Said staea* of 
abora f^tesc3 
to cartiln l i 
20)ltbe^Nortlirest 
©fASeetion 20; 
^the Ifarth-
of Sect-
faeaat comer 
,20*73 chains, 
ginning, except 
described 
Range $ l i s t , 
s *r* the Joint 
entitled 
said parties 
being desirous by sad through this agreement to deter-
nine the respective rights of said parties* 
•NOW THEREFORE, said parties shore nsaed do hereby 
oorenant and agree as follows: 
•That beginning with tte 1st dsgr of larch of each and every 
year, said water from said streaa is to be turned on what 
is known as the East Sids Ditch, at a point particularly 
described as follows, tonwit: 
"said water upon being turned at the above described 
point shall flow, for a period of six days and nights, 
over the property above described, belonging to the 
fourth psrty, above naaed, to-wit, William Booth* Said 
water to take a natural oourse over said property, thus 
allowing it to flow over the property belonging to the 
parties of the first part, situated below point where wnu 
is turned into said East Sids Ditch. 
"At the and of above stated six day and night period 
water shall next be turned and let run and divided in 
two placas as follows: twa-thirda to be turned out i n n 
ditch described as follows, to-wit: 
"and one-third to be turned on wch described as 
follows, to-witJ 
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"such water is to be turned and used far the next 
period of six days and nights by the parties of the 
first part. Said water is to take a natural course over 
the land, thus without interruption by any artifioial 
means, is to flow and spread over the lands of the 
parties of the first part, and by such natural course flows 
over portions of the lands of the parties of the third 
part and party of the fourth part. 
"That at the end of the second six day and night period 
said water shall be turned and divided at a point in the 
main channel, particularly described as follows, to witt 
"so that one-half of said^atrem goes Vest ax^ spreads 
"That at the end of said three periods designated above, 
a total of twenty-one dagra and nights, said water shall 
go back to place of beginning and rotate every twenty-one 
days as above described, from the date of March 1st of 
each year up to and including the l$th day of November 
of each year. 
"That on the 15th day of November of each year said water 
shall be divided in four parts, one-fourth to be used at 
each of the four turning out points above described by 
each of the four parties, it being understood that ths 
water is to take the sane natural course that it has here-
tofore SaLd arrangement to oontinue froa said 15th day 
of November of each year to the first day of March of the 
following year. 
"IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties above naoed to this 
agreement that no new ditches shall be made in ths prop-
erty owned by the first parties} ths second parties, or 
the fourth parties, except upon the mutual agrMisnt of 
all parties to this contract; but said parties will have 
the right to keep in xwpair and to clean all ditches used 
upon said premises. 
"IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties hereto that no 
additional rights can be acquired by any one of the above 
named parties, from anyone or all of the other parties, 
by adverse uses, prescriptive rights, or otherwise, 
other than the rights which are specified in this agree-
ment; except the same is acquired through sale or pur-
chase. 
"IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties hereto "that when 
any expense is incurred for maintenance of ditches, 
making new ditches, building bead-gates, or taking care 
of the water in any manner, said expenses shall be borne 
equally, one-fourth each to and by the respective parties 
hereto. 
•IT IS FURTHER AKREED bj the parties hereto that if 
said water right Is sold In i t s entirety, that the money 
thus obtained from the sale of the same shall be divided 
as follows: one-half to the parties of the f irst part; 
one-eighth to the parties of the second part] one-eighth 
to the parties of the third part, and one-fourth to the 
party of the fourth part 
•IT IS FORMER AGREED lay the parties hereto that during 
haying t lme^pi | i sr^i |^ ton or/fiftesn d ^ ; be tsssu 
the 1st day of J ^ of each 
year, said water;is:£cyfes twwid st t ths meadow onto other 
land to be designated and determined at the discretion 
sf the f i rs t , seorad and forarth parties. 
tIT IB FQRTHB^A$BP>|^  that the 
rtspeettv* p i r t l ^ conven-
ient place to be designaUd by said parties on the 2nd 
Tuesday in January of each year to determine axqr matters 
of business that night properly COM before said parties* 
•IN TEStmasi WHEREOF, the respective parties to this 
agreement have hereunto sst tfaiir hands to quadruple < i yp-
ies the day and y**r f irst above written 
Party of the Fourth tart' 
T&at at all times since said oral agreement, made in approximately 1?>0, a l l 
of the waters of Fishing Creek or Three Kile Creek have been used by the plaint-
iffs and said defendants in accordance with said agreement* except that in re* 
cent years sons new ditches hate been Bade and the old ditches have not always 
been kept clean and In repair • 
6. That the plaintiffs and defendants Irathall, Brora and Anderson 
entered into a written contrast to govern the use of the water of Three Mile or 
Fishing Greek from November l e t to Maroh 1st. Said agreement i s as follows t 
•BOS iOEEHffiirr * a d e ^ 
Tooele O w * * * ^ * ^ ^ 
Me jrtfe, M A X B l i A . ^ 
BOOTHS end IJIXUH MABfeL300TBS/ ^ s wife, MOBHIS 
WRATHAT.T, and K j ^ j y ^ ^ W. 
PABj^CHIKISS^^ 
his wife, and SAMUEL H. WBTHIHOTOK and UBBT B. WQRTH-
IHQTOH, his wife, a l l of Qrantsville, Tooele County, 
State of Utah. 
•WITHESSETPx 
•WHEREAS Fishing Creek, a tributary to Qreat Salt Lake, 
is a natural stream flowing in a northwesterly direction 
through and supplying water to the lands owned by the 
parties hereto or in which they have an interest, to 
wit* 
Sections $, 6, 7, 8, ?, 16, 17, 18, 1?, 20, 
21, 28 and 29, all in Township 2 South, Bang* 
5 W. Salt Late Base and Meridian} and 
"WHEREAS the parties hereto and their respective pred-
ecessors in Interest have for many* years past diverted 
and need during the winter months of Bovaaber, December, 
January and February of each year all of the waters of 
Pishing Creek and have plaoed the sane to beneficial 
use upon their respective lands during said winter months 
and 9T9 BO t v ae tacwn all of the persons <»i«4»^g *qy 
right, title sad interest in and to said stream or th§ 
waters thereof during said winter months} and 
•WHEREAS aome u£ the parties hereto have decided to 
change their point of diversion and method and pl^ce 
of the use of a portion of the waters of Fishing ^ eek 
and have made applications in the office of the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah so to do, which said appli-
cations are now pending and which would, in the opinion 
of some of the parties hereto, be prejudicial to their 
respective rights and would, except for this Agreement, 
require protests in the Office of the State Engineer 
concerning said pending applications and in all probab-
ility would require litigation between the parties. 
"NOT, THEREFORE, for the purpose of partitioning and 
setting aside to the respeotbr* parties hereto their 
share of the waters of eaid oraak during aaid winter 
aonths and for the purpoee of avoiding contests, litiga-
tion and dieagreeaent beJbaaan the tpartiee hereto and 
with the intent and purpose of quitting the respective 
claims of the parties hereto the aaid Fiahing Qreek and 
the rights to the use of the waters flowing therein, it 
is hereby agreed for valuable consideration between the 
parties hereto as f ollowsi 
"1, That aaid Paul X* Wrathall and Maxwell A* Johnson 
shall ba entitled lor purpoeed etorage or otherwiee to 
the entire flow of Fiahing Ctaeek daring the months of 
January and February of .aaoh year, and the aaid Paul £* 
Wrathall being entitled to and undivided Ij/lOth interest 
of the flow af aaid Oroek dur ^ aaid soothe of January 
StiSlrS ^ S&S^^^^a^^^SS 5" 
aaid Qraek during aaid months of-January and February* 
•2. That the remaining>artiea hereto, wis* William 
Boothe, Morris Irathall, Irene W. Page, Charles H. Worth-
Ington and Samuel VU Wbrthington, celleotively ehall ba 
entitlad to « * > # a * i » ^ ^ the 
months of Kovenber and December of aaoh year and each 
of the parties last named ehall ba the ownara and entit-
led to the use of an undivided l/5th interest In aaid 
stream and the flow thereof during aaid months of Novem-
ber and December of aaoh year* 
l» It la agreed that each party hereto may institute 
such proceedings in the Offloa of the State Engineer or 
otherwise as ha may deem desirable or necessary to secure 
for himself the maximu benefits of the water portioned 
to him by this Agreement, which said applications shall 
not be inconsistent with this Agreement, and that no 
party hereto will object to or vpoae aaid applications 
of the other, but that the rights 1 A and to aaid creek 
and the waters thereof shall, regardless of said proceed-
ings in the office of the State Engineer or otherwise, 
be and remain as sat forth In this Partition Agreement, 
and it la contemplated and Intended that this agreement 
shall be controlling and paramount to aaid proceedings 
or any certificate pureuant thereto and that aaid pro-
ceedings shall be deemed to ba In aid only of the relative 
and proportionate rights of the parties hereto as herein 
set forth. 
*h. It Is contemplated that Paul E* Irathall and 
Maxwell A, Johnson will divert their share of the water 
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apportioned to them hereby from Fishing Creek and store 
the same in a resenroir and that the same may be used 
by them during the irrigation season, and in that event 
they propose to change the use which they have made of 
said water with the result that their share of said water 
will not continue to flow through the channel through 
which their water has heretofore been distributed and 
thence to sons of the remaining parties hereto.
 t^^-
"5. It is agreed that the said Paul E. feathall and 
Maxwell A. Johnson will give and grant to the remaining 
parties hereto who aay require it, an easement for a 
ditch crossing their lands in a direct manner so as to 
enable said other parties to conduct the waters from 
Pishing Greek to their respective fends and In consider-
ation of said grant, the parties receiving said easement 
agree that they will maintain the ditches or the easement 
thus granted to the end that their share of the water 
froa ealdN Fishing Creek will be conducted across the lands 
of said Pfcul B« Yrathsll.and Uaxwell A* Johnson and will 
not be permitted to flew or flood thereon* 
•6. This agrtiSMrt is intended as a partition of the 
rights of the ^parties hereto to the winter water only of 
Fishing Greek daring the aofcths of lovembcr, Deoember, 
January and February of each year and is without pre Jud-
ioe to the righta^pf >£aoh$f the parties hereto in res-
pect to the urf^< thai waters of said creek during the 
balance of the year* 
*IH WITKESS1HEKB0F the parties hereto have hereunto 
set their hands the day and year first above written. 
/a/ nillaa L. Bobthe /s/ Morris Wrathall 
/s/Lillian Mabel Boothe /s/ Norma A. YSrathall 
/a/ Maxwell •. Johnson /if Paul E. Irathall 
/s/ Charles H. Yorthlngton/s/ Carrie Irathall 
/a/ Annie Yorthington /s/ Samuel K. Yorthington 
/s/ Irene V. Page by /s/ Libbie B. Yorthington 
/s/ Morris Irathall " 
7« That since prior to 1920 and continuing until about 1936, the 
lands now owned by Irene Page, J* J« Castagno and Edith Castagno, his wife, 
Paul E. Irathall and Carrie Wrathall, his wife, and Penina Anderson were all 
oimed by Janes L# Wrathall, or his estate, and were operated as one farm; that 
all of the lands owned by defendants Brown, and part of the lands of Irene Page 
were all acquired on December 30, 188b, by one Jaaes Janea, Jr., and the whole 
tnereof was thereafter operated as one farm; that the water right of Irene Page 
and the water right of Keith Brown have a ccanon origin and should be and are 
identical. 
a- • • ba^n three a - t l f 4 ~ ir^ 
d L C ^ * w— .... v ( lic o- -:3'i.r.' Cree*. tha t s 
. ^.,< *. nu. if>er.;- ar.-i s^ .t .«,rly d i r e c t i o n ; - <' tnf easu 1 
: , , . . ; •* threo d i t cher referred \>>o*'f> ** -xn-i • -
has oeen used t~ :urn ;«?^ «rat*~ * - ••- a - .* p^^-.at-
Iff >*>*» -. - . . * .* :? *orthingtor, . t 
I ii"« ... :..»HI. t i l t i n . 4-«, p a s t has been used to 
i "if i" - . e .ands of &.11 zi tne p ia :n t i f t?< -. ••* *^  *nr defendar 
and defendants Wrathalljj that the westerly most ctl i«„ t > 
buil t approximately seven year1! v o ' \ i i H I U \ •riicli imd been UWHI 
for ovflr fifty \"«a","«" i l i1  most d i t o h li1 and the d i t o h which i t 
2 •• "»» i»w ^ r • f i f ty years las t past been used to furnish water to the 
lands of defendants Irathall and Anderson and to the plaint i f fs Johnson and 
Worthingtoni that under ths mutual oral agreement aade and acquiesced in "by the 
said parties and their predecessor f" , v Lor from Three Mile or 
Fishing Creek has of the water runs and has run in 
t; for s ix days after which ths easterly most ditch d 
has been shut off dry and t i l ths water i s and lias been diverted int> » -
ter ditch] thai i t i s and has "been allowed to \w i < ntch l"oi Bi.i 
days, after which the ctnV" "tlteh \ M' i •• i " snuL off dry and al l of the 
water 1 ^ ml m- > > iiuorled Wito the westerly aost ditch, where I t Is 
and I'Hi in i |iir'i! nil I'i» t«ni UJ ran for nine days, ultflr whloli the westerly must 
ditch i s and has been shut off dry and the NUUJX1 la «uiJ lias been t l* 
i nto th" easterly moat ditch .. 
\ lhat the ditch which IJII» "c i- i„ west turn diverts from 
iha nut ' «.- * ii't '.i j oar ter J-I Section 28, Township 2 South, 
tAiifi" M- ' u-in if lately south ol HUB landa of the defendants 
Brown described above; that said ditch runs thenoe I i ii > 
direct ion, Uirnutfh the northwest quarter i I M h"I• I " 'L 1,1,1,1,
 i M | an ij crosses the 
Southwest corner 1 f 11• I I I ll I I koU Itrmrn In Section 28; tha t said 
ditch * «i Uiiilii iif ll'*} p la in t i f f Page -* -iDe** «> -«* • >s-
sing the sectior ^ine which i s eomion to Socti-ns 28 and 2Q sn^ 
w t n e a s t quarter of the northeast quarter of a c t i o n 29; that said ditch then 
continues in a general northwesterly direction across the lands of tte plaint-
i f f s Pare and leaves the west 3ide of the Pane land immediately north of the 
section li^e which i s common to Sections 20 and 29; that that ditch then turns 
toward the north and runs more or less parallel to the west fence line of Irene 
Pare in the southeast quarter of Section 20 adjacent to an area known as the 
Blue Lakes; that said Blue Lakes consist of two natural ponds which have been 
enlarged and improved 00 that they wi l l store water; that one of said ponds 
i s southwest from the other and both are located In Section 20, as aforesaid; 
that said east ditch i s so constructed that i t w i l l divert water from Fishing 
Creek into the Blue Lakes; that the plainti f fs Johnson have a right to u t i l i s e 
the Blue Lakes for storage purposes! together with the defendants Wrathall, but 
that the pla int i f fs Worthington have no right to store water in the Blue Lakes; 
that there i s an existing ditch which diverts water from the most northerly 
Blue Lake near the center of Section 20; that said ditch runs thence in a gen-
eral northeasterly direction across the lands of Paul E, Irathall in tee north-
east quarter of Section 20 on to the lands of the p la int i f f s Johnson i n the 
southeast quarter of Section 17, across the east half of Section 17 on to the 
lands of the pla int i f f s Worthington in the north half of the northeast quarter 
of Section 17; that there i s no ditch now in existence which wi l l connect the 
west ditch to the ditch from the northerly Blue Lake, and that water can only 
be diverted from the west ditch by f i r s t diverting i t into and through the 
Blue Lakes; that i t i s practical to construct a ditch which wi l l connect the 
west ditch with the ditch from Blue Lakes; that said connecting ditch would 
cross the land of the defendant Penina Anderson in Section 20; that Penina 
Anderson and her lessee , Paul Wrathall, have agreed to convey a right of way 
across said land immediately north of and adjacent to the dam on the northerly 
Blue Lake to connect the west ditch with the ditch from the Blue Lakes, said 
conveyance to be to the pla int i f f s Johnson and worthingtona and the p la int i f f s 
Johnson and Worthington have agreed to pay to defendant Paul Irathall and Penina 
after 
W. Anderson the sum of $100*00 for said right of wayP and that/said ditch i s 
constructed the plaint i f fs Worthington should take their water to their lands 
through the »est ditch, thence through the new connecting ditch across the lands 
- 1$ -
of Penlna Anderson and thence through the exis t ing ditch from the northerly 
Blue Lake, across the lands of Anderson, Vfrathall and Johnson to the lands of 
the Worthingtons, and the p l a in t i f f s Worthington should not thereafter have 
the r ight to flood their water across the lands of the Johnsons, Wrathalls or 
Anderson; that the p la in t i f f s Johnson should take the i r water through the west 
ditch and e i ther use the same through the Blue Lakes, or use the sarae through 
the aforementioned connecting d i t ch , but the p l a i n t i f f s Johnson should not, 
after the connecting ditch i s constructed, have the r ight to flood their water 
across the lands of the Defendants Anderson or Wrathall . That said wast ditch 
i s shown on p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit B with a purple l ine and aald leap i s hereby 
referred to for further cer ta in ty . 
10. That the location of the various t r a c t s of land owned by each 
party in relationship to the t r a c t s owned by other par t i es i s shown on p la in t -
i f f s 1 Exhibit B, and said exhibi t i a herety refer red to for further certainty; 
that i t i s wasteful to permit the water to flow continuously over the lands to 
the head of the system, as has been done in the pas t , and tha t i t i s against 
public policy to permit said continued wastej t ha t the defendants prefer to hare 
said waters taken from their lands except during their own water turns, and 
the p l a in t i f f s prefer to take said water in turns through ditches rather than 
to obtain i t only after the water has been flooded over the lands of others. 
11 . That the diverting works and di tches which are maintained to 
u t i l i z e the waters of Three Mile Creek or Fishing Creek are in need of repair; 
that said ditches and diverting works should be cleaned and repaired, and the 
expense of such repair work and expense of future maintenance of said ditches 
should be shared by the pa r t i e s in accordance with the provisions of Section 
100-1-9, Utah Code Annotated, 19^3. 
12. The court finds tha t the di tch which has been used to convey 
water for what has formerly been known as the center turn i s the old natural 
channel as i t runs northwesterly through the lands of the defendants jrown in 
Section 28; that i t crosses in to the southrost quarter of the-southwest quarter 
of Sect ion 21 and thence into uhe lands of the p l a in t i f f Page in the southeast 
quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 20; that par t of said natural channel 
is shown by orange lines on plaintiffs1 Exhibit B, and said exhibit is hereby 
referred to for further certainty as to the location of said natural channel, 
and any of the parties should be permitted to use said natural channel and 
should be permitted to clean, repair and maintain said natural channel across the 
lands of the defendants Brown and the plaintiff Page; that during the periods of 
time when other persons are entitled to use the water, said natural channel is 
not to be obstructed by the defendants Brown, but during the times the defend-
ants Brown are entitled to use the water they may temporarily obstruct said 
natural channel to divert water therefrom} that if said natural channel is 
used by more than one person to divert water upon the lands of these parties, 
then there shall be installed on slid natural channel suitable diverting works 
and headgates so that the water can be diverted from said natural channel or 
returmd to said natural channel from any artifioal ditches by permanently 
constructed mechanical type headgates, and the expense of said construction 
shall be borne jointly by the persons using said natural channel in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 110-1-9, Utah Cods Annotated, lft), and each of 
the partis s should be enjoined from placing obstructions across said natural 
channel which are not so designed that they can be mechanically opened to per-
mit the water to pass through when said obstruction is not being used to divert 
water » 
13. That the ditches which have been used for the east turn consist 
of several ditches across the lands of the defendants Brown and the plaintiff 
Page; that instead of using the water through said existing ditches across the 
lands of the defendants Brown, a new ditch should be constructed at the joint 
expense of those who desire to use it down the easterly side of the property of 
the defendants Brown in the Southwest quarter of Section 21 and the Nortfasest 
quarter of Section 28, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, but said ditch must not 
be construe tad on the lands of the defendants Brown which are irrigated at the 
present time, but that said ditch shouldrtmyeast of said hay grounds. It is, 
however, expressly provided that said ditch need not be constructed along the 
east ffcnce on the defendants9 property, but that said ditch may be constructed 
immediately adjacent to but east of the irrigated or hay grounds* 
lln That until the new ditches provided for above are made, the 
parties hereto may continue to use the water as it has been used in the past, 
by flooding it across the upper lands; that within six months from the date of 
this decree all new ditches, headgates, diverting works and repairs should be 
made, and thereafter only three ditches should be used by the downstream users, 
to wit, (a) the west ditch through the connecting ditch across the Penina 
Anderson property and thence across the Anderson, Wrathall, Johnson and Worthin-
gton properties; (b) the old natural channel through the properties of the 
defendants Brown and the plaintiff Page; and (c) the new ditch along the east 
side of the Brown property; that In the event plaintiff Irene Page does not 
grant rights of way across her property to plaintiffs Castagno and Worthington 
for the conveying of the water to the head of the Castagno lands along a route 
which is feasible, then the plaintiffs Castagno and the plaintiffs Worthington 
shall have the oontlxraed easement and right to flood the Irene Page land to get 
the water to their land, and shall have the right to clean all exieting ditches, 
as shown on plaintiffs1 Exhibit B^at reasonably frtc^nt^Jjhtervals, and during 
the tin the plaintiffs Castagno and the plaintiffs Worthington are entitled 
to use the water no obstructions of any kind shall be plaoed in any of the ditches 
which cross the land of Irene Page. 
15 • The court finds that on an average from the first day of March 
to the 31st day of October, inclusive, Three Mile or Fishing Greek will yield 
twelve acre feet of water per day at the point of diversion which formerly has 
been used by the parties for the east, the middle and the vest turns; Jthat the 
stream may fluctuate slightly above or slightly below said average, and in de-
termining the number of days each year during which each of the parties is to 
be permitted to use the water the computation shall always be based upon the 
assumption that said stream yields twelve acre feet per day* 
16. That because of the manner in which the water has been used in 
the past, as reflected by the contract which is set out in full In paragraph J> 
hereof, the lands at the head of the «yste* should be granted a better water 
right than the lands at the lower end of the system, but all the lands should 
receive sone water throughout the irrigation season. The court further finds 
that in the 2U-5 day- om March 1st to October 31st, inclusive, the stream will 
yield an averace of ive acre feet per day, or a total of 29hO acre feet which 
should be divided ar^  the parties a3 follows: 
Name 
Irene Page 
fcenina W# Anderson 
Keith Brown, Elva Brc> 
ten Brown, Mrs. Quint 
Jack Brown and Dona E. 
Paul E. Wrathall and L 
Wrathall 
J. J. Castagno and E&* 
Castagno 
Maxwell A. Johnson ana 
Erna Johnson 
Samuel H. Worthington, 
B. Worthington, Charle 
Worthington and Annie 
Worthington ^ 
Areas 
Irrigated 
102.0 
8.0 
, Quin- 76.0 
-own, 
.-!•., Igfttf 
^m 
ISSiS 
L_vby 232*0 
Number Aore 
Feet Available 
On Average 
k.o 
U#o 
luO 
4*so a*. f|jy 
3#7S 
3 # 0 
2*8 
Portion of 
Stream Awarded 
Each Irrigation 
Season 
U08/29h0ths 
32/29U0ths 
30i*/29UOths 
• 537/29UOths 
369/29UOths 
6ffi/29it0th8 
6l8/29iiOth« 
17. That at **• 
east, the center and ti 
to divert water into th 
in paragraph UU, and th 
oost of said installatl 
the amount of water aw* 
18. The use of 
individual will have an 
during his turn will hat. 
of each of his turns. I 
to the period of time wtr 
tated on a fifteen day b* 
r*oint where water has been diverted in the past for the 
at turns, new diverting works should be constructed 
ree ditches which are to be used as specified above 
iall be installed at equal height elevations* The 
a^ll be prorated among the parties on U B basis of 
hereby to each. 
.> water is to be rotated in turns, so that each 
-1 number of turns each season, and if ha so elects 
*> entire flow of said stream for the entire period 
~ event the parties can not unanimously agree as 
should elapse between turns, the use should be ro-
and each user shall tatae the water awarded to 
him hereby in sixteen ,16) turns of equal duration, 
19. That in early days prior to 1900 there was a natural channel which 
ran from Three iiile or Kisning Creek northerl through the lands of all of the 
parties involved tereinj that said channel was lcarer than tte surrounding lands, 
and it was difficult to maintain diverting dams to divert the water from the 
natural channel on to the surrounding lands; that the center ditch, as shown 
on plaintiffs1 Exhibit B, is the natural channel as it passes through the 
properties of the defendants Brown and enters upon the properties of the plaint-
iff Page) that other sections of the natural channel have been from tine to 
time abandoned, and by the mutual consent and aoqoiesenee of the parties have 
been replaced by other ditches* 
20. That the lands purchased by the defendants Brown from Francis 
Hunter have no water rights from Fishing Creek} that water was first used thereon 
in approximately 1926; that no filing was made in the office of the State En-
gineer; that the use of water thereon was not adverse to aqr of the other par-
ties; that the use of water beginning in 1926 would not constitute an appro-
priation. 
21. That Milo Q. Higley filed Application No. 17839 in the office 
of the State Engineer on the 15th ^ ; ^ second 
feet of water from Fishing Creek; that said application was approved, but lim-
ited to a use of water from October 1st to October 31st of each year) that said 
approval by the State Engineer was expressly made subject to prior rights; that 
the rights of the parties as set forth above, require all of the waters of 
Fishing Creek for year around use, and the defendants Higley have no right to 
use water from Fishing Creek. 
22. That defendants Robert Lawrence and Delia Lawrence, his wife, 
have no water rights in Fishing Creek; that Maxwell A. Johnson is purchasing 
all of the lands of the Alex Johnson estate, which were irrigated from Fishing 
Croek, and said lands and the water rights therefor are included in the acre-
8Lgef and the water to be awarded to Maxwell A. Johnson and orna Johnson, his 
wjfe. 
23* l'hat the lands of all of the parties described ibove are alkaline; 
that by applying water to the lands the alkaline salts have been washed there-
from; that in the lands which have been irrigated in the past the salts have 
been for the roost part washed from the lands and the waste water from upper 
irrigation is not laden with alkaline salts; that if any of the parties commence 
the irrigation of lands which have not been irrigated in the past, said salts 
will probably beoowa laden with alkaline salts until said lands have been washed 
clean, and that said waste waters flowing from said new lands should be con-
trolled by Q* owner of the land 00 irrigated so that the salt laden waters 
will not flow on to and deposit the water and salts on the lands of the lower 
users} that subject to this'condition the oartias shall have the right to irri-
gate any of the lands ^described above, and If any party shall desire to file a 
change application t^^irr'^gatejothar lands with the water awarded to him by the 
decree, no other par^^^ to protest said change application; 
and this decree ahan Dewiv^*fprejudice to the right of any party to file 
a change appHoattonm^ parties so 
irrigating new lands will taice care or^nia waste water so as not to deposit 
alkaline salts on the lands of loser users* 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following 
Conclusions of Las* 
CONCLUSIONS OF IM 
1, That a decree should be entered quieting t i t l e to the use of 
water of Three Mils or Fishing Creek) that said decree should divide the use 
of the water from March 1st to March 31st as follows: 
Number Acre Portion of 
Feet Avail- Stream Awarded 
Area able on Each Irrigation 
Naue Irrigated Average Season 
Irene Page 102.0 lt.0 It08/29lt0tha 
Penina W.inderson 8.0 U.O 32/29UOths 
Kaith Brown, Blra Brows, Quia- 76.0 U.O 30U/29UOtha 
ten Brown, Mr a. Quintan Brown, 
Jack Brown and Dona Brown 
Portion of 
Number Acre Stream Awarded 
Area Feet Available £ach Irrigation 
Name Irrigated on Average Season 
Paul K. ffrathall and 13/.25 3.75 +* f * \ 537/29hOths 
Carrie Wrathall q,** e>* fm^r-iffc-
J. J. Castagno and Edi' 98.U 3.75 369/29l40tns 
Castagno 
Maxwell k. Johnson and 192.5 3.50 67U/29hOths 
Erna Johnson 
Samuel H. Worthington, ' b y 232*0 2*8 6l8/29UOths 
B* Worthington, Charle1 
Worthington and Annie I 
Worthington 
That the irrigation sear or, should be fixed as beginning March 1st and ending 
October 31st* 
2 . That from V mber 1st to the following March 1st the use of water 
should be governed by th& written contract which i s set forth above in fu l l in 
the Findings of Fact* 
3 . The use of water i s to be rotated in turns, so that each individ-
ual w i l l have an equal nun ?r of turns each Irrigation season and may. i f he so 
e l ec t s , during his turn hava the entire flow of said stream for the entire 
period of each of his turn*. In the event the parties can not uananlmously 
agree as to the period of tr'iae which should elapse betireen turns the use should 
be rotated on a f ifteen day basis, and each user shall take the water awarded 
him hereby in sixteen turns ->t equal duration, so that he wi l l takB one-six-
teenth of the total water eroded to him hereby erery f i f teen days during the 
irrigation season. 
h* That the practice indulged in in the past of flooding the water 
continuously over the upstrsi^a lands of the upper users i s wasteful and con-
trary to public policy; that each user should be given the right to take the 
water to the head of his larvi in a closed ditch i f he so e l ec t s , without f i r s t 
spreading i t over the lands of others above him* 
5. The cost of cleaning, repairing and maintaining the ditches and 
irrigation system should be pro-rated aaong the users in accordanoe with the 
- *2 -
provision of Section lX)- l -9 , Utah Code Annotated, iyi*3. 
6. The > i a i n t i f f s We*6Myeglft&=as4 Johnson sho^ld^e adjudged to have 
t&e r ight to divert w a ^ r through the exis t ing^r^s t ditch Zs the Blue Lakes, 
/tirough the Blue Lakes to tn^headgajie^on the northerly end thereof, through 
said headgate into the exia^itlgaS^ch which leads to and across the lands of 
the p la in t i f f Johnjpnf that suitable a s s u r i n g devices should be ins t a l l ed 
thereon as J ^ p r o r l d e d in the Findings of F w t , and the headgate on Blue Lakes 
vshouitlbe l e f t , 
7. That the d i tch which has been used for the center turn through the 
lands of the defendants Brown and the p l a in t i f f Page i s the natural channel, 
and any party has the r igh t to use the same, and to keep the same cleared of 
obstructions and in repair* 
8. That the f i l i n g s made by the various p a r t i e s , as set fo r th i n the 
Findings of Fact, ahould be affirmed i n accordance with the terms of the w r i t -
ten s t ipu la t ion , subject , however, to the i r being approved i n accordance with 
the laws of the State of Utah in the office of the State ingineer . 
9* That the defendants Hilo 0. Higley and Blanche Higley, h is wife, 
and Robert Lawrence and Delia Lawrence, h is wife, have no water r igh t s in Three 
Uile Springs or Fiahing Creek and each of them should be enjoined from d i v e r t -
ing or using water therefrom. 
10, That the decree should be without prejudice to the r igh t of any 
party to f i l e a change applicat ion, and tha t the decree should provide that 
if mfgrjjarty i r r i g a t e s new or different lands he must take care of h is waste 
W 4 t ^ r ! ; W ^ ^ t ^ ? ^ J ^ ^ s a l t s washed from the new lands w i l l not be de-
posited j o i ^ ^ ^ c ^ of any other party hereto. 
I3J^TKafcj51icH"1of the pa r t i e s should bear his own costs incurred 
h0reln#
' rt «£*4^ 
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STATE OF UTAH 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
Water Rights 
1636 West North Temple- Suite 2?U • Salt Lake City t i l l " ' '- • i' •.. JMII M • /,n/i 
Juno ?, 1 9 8 6 
Norman H. Bangerter. Govern< 
Dee C. Hansen. Executive Oirectc 
Robert L Morgan, State Engine* 
Russell Johnson 
P.O. Box 78 
Grantsvillef UT 84029 
Re: Wrathal-Johnson Reservoir (Bln^ Tokos) 
Gentlemen: 
The regular periodic inspection of * ho above clam was performed on May 20, 
1986. In attendance were Ward Waq-.tnff and nill Smart representing the Divi-
sion of Water Rights and Russell Johnson representing the owners. 
The inspection revealed that the following conditions exist: 
1. 
3. 
The embankment has inadequate freeboard and has suffered severe1erosional 
damage along the water line. 4 Tn some places along the north dike, wave 
action has almost washed throuah the embankment. 
The outlet was completely inonotable. 
There was no actual spillway for rhe dam. The water level in the reser-
voir was maintained by outflow throuah a marsh area around the east end 
of the northeast dike. 
4. The reservoir received water from rhe Grnnrsville sewage treatment ponds, 
and in effect, acts as an additional pond in the series. 
5. The embankment is quite low - porhaps 10 feet at the highest point- and 
the upstream slope into the reservoir is very shallow. A wash-out 
failure to the dam would probably occur slowly rather than suddenly, and 
would probably cause little damaqe downstream except possibly to a few 
gravel roads. 
Mr. Johnson stated that the reservoir had not actively been used for many 
years and that to his knowledqe, there was no valid water right for the water 
in the reservoir. 
After reviewinq the status and condition of tho darn, it is our conclusion that 
the owners* have the option of abandoning the dam, which would include breach-
ing itl to a poir^ t where the reservoir is stabilized, or repairing the dam and 
resuming its use I 
If the dam is to be repaired, the followinq conditions must be met: 
1. A valid water riqht for the impoundment must be obtaine"d. This should be 
coordinated through the appropriate area office. 
n n n m n**> 
Russell Johnson 
Page 2 of 2 
June 2, 1986 
2. The embankment must be repaired where it has been damaged by erosion. 
The height of the dam relative to the water level must also be increased 
so that there is adequate frooboatd. 
3. An adequate spillway must be constructed. 
4. The outlet must be replaced. 
5. Other related problems which should be corrected at the time the repairs 
are made include the removal of t ron<* and rodents and repairs of the tree 
and rodent damage, and the dra inane of the bog away from the toe of the 
dam. 
You are hereby granted thirty days from the date of this letter to notify us 
of your intentions regarding the subject dam. If you have problems contacting 
the other owners or determining who they are, please feel free to let us know-
After'•jwe have received your reply, we will respond in detail concerning the 
requirements for the dam. 
If any of the above require further discussion or clarification, please feel 
free to contact Richard Hall or Ward Wagstaff of the Dam Safety Section. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Robert L. Morgan, P.E. 
State Engineer 
RLM:rbh:ww 
cc: Jesse Anderson, Weber Area Officr 
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STATE OF UTAH 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
Water Rights 
1636 West North Temple • Suite 220 • Salt Lake City. UT 84116-3156 * 801-533-6071 
Norman H Bangerter. Governor 
Dee C. Hansen. Executive Director 
Robert L Morgan. State Engineer 
May 5 , 1986 
Paul Wrathal/Max Johnson 
Grantsville, Utah 
84029 
Re: Wrathal/Johnson Dam 
Gentlemen: 
Sections 73-5-5 and 73-5-6 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 charge the State 
Engineer (The Utah Division of Water Rights) with the responsibility of irt-
specting dams in Utah. The State Engineer is also charged with the respon-
sibility to direct the owners to make any repairs which, based on the inspec-
tion , could threaten the integrity* of the dam, the spillways, the outlets, or 
other related facilities. 
This year's dam inspection is scheduled for Tuesday, May 20, 1986. We will 
meet at Wrathal/Johnson Dam at 9:00 a.m. Please have an owner's representa-
tive present at the dam to answer questions and operate the outlet and any 
appurtenant facilities. 
If you have any questions, scheduling conflicts, or you can not arrange to 
have a representative at the site, please contact the Dam Safety Section of 
this office. Your cooperation will be appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Richard B. Hall, P.E. 
Directing Dam Safety Engineer 
RBH/cp 
cc: Jesse Anderson, Weber Area Engineer 
0000200 
